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CORPORATE FORM AND SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION
WILLIAM H. WIDEN*
INTRODUCTION
Legislators have often shown a disposition to follow the counsels of equality 
under the name of equity to which greater latitude has been conceded than to 
justice: but, this idea of equity, vague and ill developed, has rather seemed a 
matter of instinct than of calculation. It is only by much patience and order 
that a multitude of incoherent and confused sentiments can be reduced into 
rigorous propositions—JEREMY BENTHAM.
In the Owens Corning bankruptcy case, the allocation of approximately 
US $1 billion turns on the application of the arcane equity doctrine of 
substantive consolidation.  A district court judge had ordered the substantive 
consolidation of various Owens Corning subsidiaries to facilitate a plan of 
reorganization.1 In substantive consolidation, the inter-company liabilities 
of the subject companies are eliminated, the assets of these subject 
companies are pooled and the third party liabilities of the subject companies 
are satisfied from this single pool of assets.  This pooling of assets changes 
the percentage recovery, for better or worse, that individual creditors would 
receive in the absence of a consolidation.2 The judge approved a special 
type of substantive consolidation known as a “deemed” consolidation, in 
which legal entities are not actually combined but distributions to creditors 
are made “as if” there had been a business combination.  The order 
benefited various unsecured bond holders and trade creditors to the 
detriment of a syndicated lending group.  The Third Circuit reversed,3
siding with the syndicated lenders who argued that the facts did not support 
use of substantive consolidation doctrine.
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corporate and commercial law at Cravath, Swaine & Moore in New York City from 1984 to 
2001, where he was a partner from 1991.  I am grateful for advice and database assistance 
from Professor Lynn M. LoPucki at the UCLA School of Law; without his bankruptcy 
database, it would not have been possible to start my exploration of the prevalence of 
substantive consolidation in bankruptcy.  I am grateful for valuable discussions with Caroline 
Bradley, David Carlson, Michael Froomkin, Stephen Halpert, Fran Hill, Elliott Manning, 
George Mundstock, Patricia Redmond, Robert Rosen and Stephen Vladeck.
 THEORY OF LEGISLATION, VOL. I 134 (1840).
1 In re Owens Corning, 316 B.R. 168 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004).
2
 Examples of the procedure appear hereinafter in Part I. The Structure of the Owens Corning 
Dispute and Part IV. The Efficiency Promotion Rationale.
3 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005), petitions for cert. filed 74 USLW 3395 
(Dec. 23, 2005) and 74 USLW 3443 (Jan. 26, 2006).
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Though any billion dollar decision focuses the mind, the case has larger 
ramifications.  For three principal reasons, Owens Corning holds highest
significance for commercial finance.  First, the trillion dollar securitization 
industry must craft structured financing transactions that withstand 
attempted substantive consolidation of the special purpose companies 
(SPCs) used in those financings.4
Second, the mere threat of substantive consolidation provides an 
impetus for creditors in non-structured financings to reach agreement on 
reorganization plans for fear of the consequences of non-agreement.  The 
recently confirmed reorganization plans for Worldcom, Inc., Enron Corp. 
and Conseco, Inc.—the three largest bankrupt companies ever reorganized 
in the United States—all reflect this influence.  Bargaining over the 
structure of reorganization plans takes place in the shadow of the doctrine of 
substantive consolidation.5
Third, the possibility of substantive consolidation informs and shapes
the restructuring of debtors with unsecured syndicated financing.  
Syndicated finance is one of the largest capital markets in the world, often 
using unsecured guarantees as part of a financing structure.  Before Owens 
Corning, the marketplace considered the presence of these guarantees as a 
reason to impose substantive consolidation.  In a complete reversal, Owens 
Corning transforms intercompany guarantees into a tool to oppose 
substantive consolidation.  Substantive consolidation case law does not 
currently theorize how to address the special problems presented by 
syndicated lending.
The first two considerations pull in opposite directions.  The
securitization industry prefers significant limits on the scope of substantive 
consolidation.  It hovers between panic and dread whenever a judge, like the 
district court judge in Owens Corning, suggests that the doctrine applies to a 
wider range of cases.  On the other hand, use of the doctrine can greatly 
simplify restructuring a bankrupt family of companies, potentially reducing 
costs associated with accounting for a multitude of separate entities.  Many 
unsecured creditors recoil whenever a judicial decision, like that of the 
Third Circuit in Owens Corning, proposes new limits on application of the 
4 See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S CORPORATION, LEGAL CRITERIA FOR U.S. STRUCTURED 
FINANCE TRANSACTIONS, 43-53, (Apr. 1, 2004) (discussing special purpose entities) 
available at http://www2.standardpoors.com/spf/fixedincome/SF_legal_criteria_FINAL.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2006).
5 See, e.g., Robert N. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Robert Cooter & Stephen Marks (with Robert 
Mnookin), Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 
J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover 
Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 621 (2003).
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doctrine.
If the practical threat of substantive consolidation disappears, then so 
does a leverage point to negotiate certain types of reorganization plans.  I 
believe this result would tend to disadvantage small creditors and tort 
claimants.  Academics have considered how the institution of secured credit 
disadvantages these creditor classes,6 but attention has not focused on how 
syndicated lending practices may disadvantage this same group by other 
means.  This Article shows how substantive consolidation may reduce this 
disadvantage.
The Owens Corning decisions collectively manifest a failure of courts 
to articulate clear parameters for a doctrine vitally important to modern 
corporate finance.  This Article will argue that, while capital markets have 
evolved sophisticated securitization and syndication techniques, 
development of the doctrine of substantive consolidation has failed to keep 
pace.  This Article offers a critique of existing doctrine and offers a way 
forward for development of the doctrine that remains sensitive to the needs 
of these two important areas of finance while also preserving some balance 
in reorganization negotiations.
First, this Article shows how and why substantive consolidation 
doctrine profoundly affects America’s largest insolvency cases.  It begins by 
examining details of the Owens Corning bankruptcy and then looks more 
broadly at recent large reorganizations.  Second, the Article goes behind the 
case law rhetoric, encumbered as it is by a plethora of factors and tests, to 
suggest three rationales for the use of substantive consolidation: an 
economic rationale, an equitable rationale grounded in corporate law veil 
piercing and an equitable rationale grounded in historical considerations of 
fairness, originating with doctrines of marshalling.  In each case, the 
purpose is to explain how substantive consolidation doctrine should be 
formulated, and not merely describe its current state of development.7
Third, the article explains why reformulation of the doctrine of substantive 
consolidation passes Constitutional muster under the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, 
Inc.8 Grupo Mexicano taught us that equitable remedies must be grounded 
6 See, e.g., SYMPOSIUM, The Priority of Secured Debt, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279 (1997).  
Discussion of a carve-out to secured credit to address fairness concerns originated with 
Professor Elizabeth Warren at Harvard.
7
 Many articles collect substantive consolidation cases in an attempt to assist our 
understanding of this body of law.  See, e.g., Mary Elisabeth Kors, Altered Egos: Deciphering 
Substantive Consolidation, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 381 (1998) (collecting cases and articles).  To 
my mind, these efforts remain a valuable resource but none synthesizes and rationalizes the 
doctrine in a manner that helps to systematically decide future cases.
8
 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
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in equity practice as it existed in 1789, absent a subsequent grant of 
statutory authority.  This Article shows how substantive consolidation may
be justified on statutory grounds and also shows that, contrary to popular 
wisdom, equity had favorably considered a consolidation remedy prior to 
1789.
On a broader level, the prevalence of substantive consolidation in our 
largest bankruptcies teaches us something about corporate form in action,
supplementing recent corporate law scholarship.  The signature book 
guiding current corporate law debates—The Anatomy of Corporate Law9—
does not explore either the impact of insolvency law on corporate form or 
the special problems raised by corporate groups.10  Professors Hansmann 
and Kraakman, two of the seven authors of The Anatomy of Corporate Law, 
stress the idea that separate corporate personality holds the key to 
understanding corporate form, proposing that separate corporate personality 
be understood in terms of “affirmative asset partitioning.”11 Because 
affirmative asset partitioning breaks down within corporate groups under 
the stress of insolvency, I argue that we must choose between a context 
sensitive and a context neutral rule for evaluating the effectiveness of asset 
partitions created using the corporate form.
I start with a brief overview of the facts in the Owens Corning decisions 
and then proceed with an examination of how and why the doctrine of 
substantive consolidation figures prominently in the largest bankruptcy 
cases in our history.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE OWENS CORNING DISPUTE
The chart below illustrates, in a simplified format, what is at stake in 
the Owens Corning decisions.  In the example Owens Cornings’ 17 
bankrupt subsidiaries become SubOne, SubTwo and SubThree, as direct
wholly-owned subsidiaries of OC Parent.  Dollar figures are fictional for 
ease of illustration.  Asset values do not include the value of any interests in 
subsidiaries.
9 REINIER KRAAKMAN ET. AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2004).
10 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1522 (2004) 
(book review of THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW).
11 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
YALE L.J. 387 (2000) [hereinafter “Hansmann & Kraakman”].  Asset partitioning has two 
facets: providing a barrier between claims of corporate creditors and investors and preventing 
liquidation of assets committed to a business by individual shareholders.
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Legal
Entities
Asset
Values
Noteholder
Claims
Loan
Amount
Lender
Claims
OC Parent $980 million $4 billion $2 billion $2 billion
SubOne $1 billion -0- -0- $2 billion
SubTwo $1 billion -0- -0- $2 billion
SubThree $20 million -0- -0- -0- 
Consolidated $3 billion $4 billion $2 billion N/A
Notice that, even though the lending syndicate’s loan amount to OC 
Parent totals only $2 billion, the lenders hold a $2 billion claim against each 
of SubOne and SubTwo.  These two other claims exist because the lenders 
required that SubOne and SubTwo provide upstream guarantees of their 
loan to OC Parent.  The lenders do not have a direct claim against SubThree 
because, as part of the negotiation with OC Parent, the lenders agreed to 
limit guarantee claims to significant subsidiaries with asset value of $30 
million or more.  This means that the equity value in SubThree benefits 
creditors of OC Parent.
These guarantees have two effects.  First, they protect the lending 
syndicate against structural subordination.  No future creditor of the 
consolidated group12 may achieve priority over the lending syndicate in the 
assets of SubOne or SubTwo.  Potential future creditors include voluntary 
contract claimants, involuntary tort claimants, the Internal Revenue Service 
and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  Second, the guarantees give 
the lending syndicate structural priority over the Noteholders, who only 
have a single claim against OC Parent.  This structural priority allows the 
lending syndicate to collect an aggregate of $2 billion out of SubOne and 
SubTwo before any Noteholder sees a dime.  This result follows from the 
general rule that a legal entity pays its creditors before its shareholders 
receive any distributions.  The guarantee claims of the lending syndicate 
turn the lenders into direct creditors of SubOne and SubTwo.  OC Parent 
only has an equity interest in SubOne and SubTwo.
The “Consolidated” row in the chart illustrates the situation if 
substantive consolidation breaks down the asset partitions created by the 
separate subsidiaries, eliminating intercompany liabilities.  The 
12
 Readers must distinguish between (i) procedural consolidation, (ii) substantive 
consolidation and (iii) a consolidated group.  Procedural consolidation simply means that a 
single court has jurisdiction over multiple related cases; it results in administrative efficiencies 
when debtors are related by common ownership but does not result in the combination of legal 
entities.  Substantive consolidation combines legal entities, either hypothetically or actually, 
for the purposes of making distributions and voting on plans.  A consolidated group is simply 
a family of companies related by common ownership that would prepare consolidated 
financial statements and tax returns; it does not imply any combination of legal entities.
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Noteholders, with $4 billion in claims, compete with the lenders, holding $2 
billion in claims, on a pari passu basis, for $3 billion in assets so that every 
creditor receives 50 cents on the dollar.  The additional lender claims 
created by the guarantees disappear in the consolidation.  For the loan 
syndicate, this represents the difference between getting paid the full $2 
billion on their loan and receiving only $1 billion.
The debtors started the proceeding that requested substantive 
consolidation prior to formal consideration of a reorganization plan.  They 
hoped to learn whether substantive consolidation would be available so that, 
if they included it as part of a plan, they would not have to start all over 
again if the court disallowed consolidation at a later stage.  A district court 
judge heard this matter, rather than a bankruptcy court judge, because 
jurisdiction had been removed from the bankruptcy court judge for reasons 
that do not matter to this analysis.
In deciding to approve substantive consolidation, the district judge
focused first on the management of the Owens Corning consolidated group, 
stating “[the court has] no difficulty in concluding that there is substantial 
identity between the [OC Parent] and its wholly-owned subsidiaries.”13  The 
presence of central headquarters control, management on a product line 
(rather than legal entity) basis, lack of separate business plans or budgets, 
dependence on the parent company for funding, centralized cash 
management and establishment of subsidiaries for the convenience of the 
parent (particularly for tax reasons),14 all supported this finding.
The district judge then found that substantive consolidation would 
greatly simplify the proceeding because questions still existed over the 
accuracy of audit results to separate the financial affairs of the Owens 
Corning companies, the key remaining problems being failures to pay 
interest on intercompany advances, calculation of intercompany royalty 
13
 316 B.R. at 171.
14
 Several of the most valuable subsidiaries in the Owens Corning consolidated group that 
provided guarantees to the lending syndicate are tax shelters.  As an example, Owens Corning 
Fiberglass Technologies, Inc. (“OCFT”), a common tax shelter known as an “intellectual 
property holding company,” owns all intellectual property in the Owens Corning consolidated 
group, licensing it back to consolidated group members.  The state tax benefits are twofold: 
consolidated group members get a state tax royalty deduction in their home states, while the 
royalty income received by OCFT is not subject to state tax because OCFT’s state of 
incorporation has no state level corporate tax.  Some states have attacked similar shelters as 
sham transactions.  See, Geoffrey v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 313 S.C. 15 (S.C. Supreme 
Ct. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993); Syms Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 436 
Mass. 505 (Mass. Supreme Ct. 2002); A & F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 167 N.C. App. 150 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004); Lanco, Inc. v. Division of Taxation, 379 N.J. Super. 562 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. 2005).
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payments15 and resolving outstanding assertions that the lending syndicate’s 
guarantees should be voided as fraudulent conveyances.16  For the district 
judge, this made a prima facie case for substantive consolidation.
The lending syndicate did not rebut this prima facie case to the judge’s 
satisfaction because he found that, though the syndicate had relied on 
guarantees to prevent others from achieving priority, in reality the syndicate 
relied on the overall credit of the consolidated group.  For example, the 
lending syndicate received consolidated financial reporting only and did not 
monitor the separate debt level at the subsidiary guarantors.
The Third Circuit reversed.  It suggested that the substantial identity 
between parent and subsidiaries created by centralized management are 
ordinarily found in consolidated groups.  It deemed problems over 
calculation of interest and royalty payments relatively minor.  Without 
minimizing fraudulent conveyance concerns over intercompany guarantees, 
it felt those issues should be handled separately, and not as part of a motion 
for substantive consolidation.  Rather than finding that the lending syndicate 
had relied on the credit of the consolidated group as a whole, the Third 
Circuit pointed to the specific negotiation of the guarantees, including a $30 
million guarantee threshold, and its belief that the syndicated loan
agreement required Owens Corning to maintain the separate existence of its
subsidiaries, as evidence that the lenders did rely on the guarantees for 
priority, and not merely to assure parity.17  The Third Circuit was unmoved 
by the fact that the offering memoranda used to market the parent company 
notes to Noteholders did not disclose their structural subordination as a risk 
factor, suggesting that the proper way to handle such concerns would be in a 
fraud suit.
15
 Royalty payment calculations that caused accounting problems relate to the intellectual 
property holding company tax shelter described above.  See supra note 14.
16
 An intercompany guarantee might produce a fraudulent transfer if the guarantor does not 
receive reasonably equivalent value for providing the guarantee (for example, if SubOne and 
SubTwo provided guarantees without receiving loan proceeds).  See generally, Phillip I. 
Blumberg, Intragroup (Upstream, Cross-Stream, and Downstream) Guaranties Under The 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 685, 689 n. 14 (1987) (collecting 
citations to articles).
17
 One of the petitions for certiorari makes much of the fact that the Third Circuit did not give 
proper deference to the fact finding of the District Court.  See 74 USLW 3395 (Dec. 23, 
2005).  These questions are not germane to the issues discussed in this Article.  The procedure 
pursuant to which a bankruptcy court makes an early determination of plan issues, prior to a 
confirmation hearing, was approved in In re Stone & Webster, 286 B.R. 532, 541-43 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2002).
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II. THE PREVALENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION
A. AN UNCOMMON REMDEY?
Courts and litigants who oppose imposition of substantive consolidation 
often claim that use of the doctrine is extraordinary.18  They stress the 
mundane nature of the facts in their cases.  The conclusion follows that, if 
substantive consolidation applies to the common case, then use of the 
doctrine will break out everywhere like a plague.  Some academics predict 
that common use of the doctrine will wreak havoc on the orderly conduct of 
business affairs.19  According to this view, the sanctity of the corporate 
form, shielding investors from personal liability for business debts, demands 
the quarantine of substantive consolidation to the truly rare situation.
The accepted wisdom, however, springs from a false premise.  In fact, 
substantive consolidation appears frequently in negotiated plans for our 
largest Chapter 11 reorganizations.  An empirical study of the 21 largest 
corporate bankruptcy filings from 2000 to 2004,20 ranked by asset size,21
reveals that substantive consolidation was imposed, proposed or settled in 
11 of those cases. Eight of the top 10 bankruptcies constituted “Substantive 
Consolidation Bankruptcies” as defined in the study.22
The contrast between the constant caution against widespread use of the 
doctrine in reported decisions and its common use in negotiated plans of 
18
 There is almost unanimous judicial consensus that the remedy is to be used sparingly.  See
In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005); see also In re Gandy, 299 F.3d 489, 499 
(5th Cir. 2002) (stating that substantive consolidation is “an extreme and unusual remedy”); 
Eastgroup Props. v. S. Motel Ass’n, Ltd., 935 F.2d 245, 248 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that 
substantive consolidation should be used “sparingly”).
19 See Brief of Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Owens Corning before the Third Circuit in 
opposition to imposition of substantive consolidation.
20 See William H. Widen, Prevalence of Substantive Consolidation in Large Bankruptcies 
from 2000-2004: Preliminary Results, AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2006), 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=878388.  [hereinafter “Prevalence of Substantive 
Consolidation”]
21
 The ranking of bankruptcy cases based on pre-filing asset size comes from WebBRD which 
adjusts asset size to current dollars.  The Owens Corning bankruptcy is the twenty first largest 
bankruptcy filed during the 2000-2004 time period.  WebBRD is a database maintained by 
Professor Lynn M. Lopucki at the UCLA School of Law.  See Lynn M. LoPucki, WebBRD: 
Lynn M. LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research Database, at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/index.htm
(last visited Dec. 21, 2005).  Professor LoPucki provided valuable insights into the advantages 
and disadvantages of various definitions that might be used to analyze data.
22
 The study counts “deemed” consolidations as “substantive consolidations” because courts 
apply the same tests, factors and justifications to order both actual consolidations and deemed 
consolidations.  Further, many creditors simply do not care about the structure of the company 
emerging from bankruptcy but focus instead on the size of the distribution received.  See
Prevalence of Substantive Consolidation, supra note 20.
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reorganization stands out with particular force because the standard for 
imposition of substantive consolidation is purported to be the same in both 
contexts.  In negotiated reorganizations, courts use substantive consolidation
both (a) in consideration of settlement of actual or potential litigation 
involving substantive consolidation and (b) in approving liquidations and 
reorganizations that impose substantive consolidation in some form.
Settlement of substantive consolidation litigation takes place in the 
shadow of substantive consolidation doctrine because, even if the parties 
consent, bankruptcy courts must still assess the propriety of the settlement.  
This independent assessment does not require the court to decide whether it 
would have imposed substantive consolidation.  Rather, the court reviews 
the settlement to determine whether, in light of the doctrine, a reasonable 
basis exists for the settlement.23
The fact that courts do not ordinarily scrutinize the merits of compromises 
involved in suits between individual litigants cannot affect the duty of a 
bankruptcy court to determine that a proposed compromise forming part of a 
reorganization plan is fair and equitable.  There can be no informed and 
independent judgment as to whether a proposed compromise is fair and 
equitable until the bankruptcy judge has apprised himself of all facts necessary 
for an intelligent and objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate success 
should the claim be litigated.24
Many reported decisions reflect court approval of settlement of 
substantive consolidation litigation.25
Courts consider substantive consolidation doctrine in detail when 
confirming plans that provide for substantive consolidation.26  This 
23
 Protective Comm. For Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 
U.S. 414, 428 (1968) (holding that a bankruptcy court may approve a fair and equitable 
settlement that is not “below the lowest point in the range of reasonableness”). Rule 9019(a) 
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provides in pertinent part that “[o]n motion by 
the trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement.”
24 Id. at 444-45 (citation omitted).
25 See, e.g., In re Stoecker, 125 B.R. 767, 774 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) ; In re Resorts Int’l, Inc., 
145 B.R. 412, 418, 459 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1990); In re Apex Oil Co., 118 B.R. 683, 688 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mo. 1990); see also In re Enron, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Confirming 
Supplemental Modified Fifth Amended Joint Plan of Affiliated Debtors Pursuant to Chapter 
11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, and Related Relief, Case No. 01-16034 (AJG), 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2004).  In In re Enron, the court spent significant time and effort in 
concluding that the terms of the settlement of substantive consolidation issues were supported 
by an assessment of the likelihood of successful litigation in light of the doctrine.
26 See, e.g., In re Lisanti, 329 B.R. 491, 497-99 (D. N.J. 2005); see also In re Worldcom Inc., 
No. 02-13533, 2003 WL 23861928, at *6-16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003).
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consideration often occurs in the context of some opposition to a plan.27
However, in In re Standard Brands Paint,28 the court considered the 
propriety of a “deemed” consolidation in a reorganization plan even though 
no party opposed it.
“Deemed consolidation” is a peculiar and awkward term of art with a 
recent vintage. In a “deemed” substantive consolidation, distinct legal 
entities are not combined.  Instead, votes on a plan, plan distributions, or
both, are computed “as if” legal entities had been combined.29 The 
procedure has become known as a “deemed” consolidation.30  Courts 
disagree over whether deemed consolidations should be considered 
substantive consolidations at all.31 I find no limitation in the Bankruptcy 
Code restricting a court’s ability to craft a limited remedy custom tailored to 
particular facts by scaling back an already accepted remedy.32  This custom 
tailoring occurs when a court orders something less than a full substantive 
consolidation to reach a fair, equitable and cost effective result.33  Indeed, a 
27
 The plan proponent, typically the debtor or debtors in possession, must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the plan meets the requirements of § 1129 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  See, e.g., In re Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 171 B.R. 926, 937 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[A] plan proponent must demonstrate that its plan satisfies section 1129(b) 
by a preponderance of evidence.”).  These requirements include that the plan not 
“discriminate unfairly” and be “fair and equitable” to creditors impaired under the plan who 
have not voted to accept it.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).  Thus, in a plan subject to this so-called 
“cram down” provision, the court would need to consider the appropriateness of imposing 
substantive consolidation as part of considering the plan as a whole.  In the absence of a plan 
cram down, the need for an express review of the appropriateness of substantive consolidation 
is less clear, though courts have considered the applicability of the doctrine even in the 
absence of objections.  See infra text accompanying note 28.  There may be individual 
creditor objections within an impaired class even if the class itself votes to accept a plan.  This 
may provide a further reason for a court to separately consider the appropriateness of 
imposing substantive consolidation.
28
 154 B.R. 563 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993).
29
 The earliest reported decision of which I am aware that considers and approves a deemed 
consolidation is In re Standard Brands Paint. Id. at 566-67 (indicating that a plan which 
made distributions as if the entities were combined, but without actually combining the legal 
entities, was “unusual, maybe unique”).  As far as the parties and the court could determine, 
the plan proposed in In re Standard Brands Paint was the first deemed consolidation, though 
the procedure was not then referred to as a “deemed” consolidation.  Id. at 573.
30 See In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 402 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 2005) (containing a 
description of a deemed consolidation by the author of the Third Circuit’s Owens Corning
decision).
31 Id.
32
 The possible Constitutional limitations on the use of equity by courts exercising bankruptcy 
jurisdiction are discussed hereinafter in Part VII. Constitutional Concerns Over Evolution of 
Equity Principles.
33
 As an equitable doctrine, some courts expressly have recognized that they may modify or 
adjust the effects of substantive consolidation to fit the circumstances of the case.  See In re
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deemed consolidation may save costs compared to a full consolidation, 
including eliminating the need to re-title property and obtain new business 
qualifications, leaving more value for creditors in a reorganized company.34
Empirical research shows that appropriate occasions for use of 
substantive consolidation are neither few nor far between.  Why does the 
case law rhetoric of rarity differ from the commonplace reality in large 
reorganizations?  Foundational work in economics and law provides an 
answer.
B. AN ECONOMIC EXPLANATION
In his examination of the role of transaction costs in determining the 
size of firms,35 Ronald Coase posited a distinction between external 
transaction costs (those costs that a firm incurs when it bargains with third 
parties to acquire goods and services) and internal transaction costs (those 
costs that a firm incurs internally to provide those same goods and services 
to itself).  He theorized that the size of the firm expands so long as the firm 
determines that the external transaction costs exceed the internal transaction 
costs of providing those goods and services.36
When we examine the structure of corporate law, we find a variety of 
mechanisms designed to allow a corporation to function as an independent,
artificial person.  The corporation has managers to determine product, set 
prices and bargain with others, together with procedures within which 
managers make these decisions (such as those found in certificates of 
incorporation and by-laws).  What should we expect to happen when 
another firm decides to provide itself with goods and services internally 
rather than continue to bargain with the third party corporation?
Often, the firm simply acquires the third party corporation—bringing 
the formerly external functions inside the firm.  This technique has many 
Standard Brands Paints, 154 B.R. at 570; In re Parkway Calabasas, 89 B.R. 832 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 1988).  Under the flexible approach, a court need not actually combine entities in order to 
take advantage of the benefits that asset pooling or voting combinations might offer in a 
particular case.
34
 In In re Standard Brands Paint, for example, tax considerations strongly favored a deemed 
consolidation without the actual combination of legal entities.  154 B.R. at 565.  An actual 
combination would have triggered cancellation of indebtedness income for state tax purposes. 
Id. 
35
 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMETRICA 386 (1937).
36 Coase’s view of the firm does not necessarily conflict with the conception of the firm as a 
nexus of contracts.  Indeed, Coase appeared to view the two theories as complementary.  See
Saul Levmore, Irreversibility and the Law: The Size of Firms and Other Organizations, 18 J. 
CORP. L. 333, 334 n. 2 (1993).
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advantages over internally developing the ability to provide those same 
goods and services, not the least of which is speed.  The acquisition may 
occur either as an asset purchase or as a stock purchase.37
From the narrow perspective of closing the acquisition at lowest cost, 
the stock purchase presents many advantages over the asset acquisition.  
The stock purchase does not require diligence to prepare asset schedules, 
transfers of title to particular assets (other than shares), assignment of 
existing contracts and licenses, rehiring of employees and other similar 
administrative matters.  Thus, in many cases, we find that the single entity 
firm acquires a subsidiary when it internalizes the production of goods and 
services.  Over time, the single entity firm grows into a complex 
consolidated corporate group, increasing in size until it no longer can 
identify cost savings that might be achieved through further growth.  (One 
might characterize such growth as the move from firm to economic 
institution, but in this Article I focus on corporate groups that function as 
single firms despite internal structure.)
After internalization of production, many of the target corporation’s 
officers and directors are no longer needed to determine product, set prices 
and negotiate with third parties.  Further, the target’s structure for 
management decision making duplicates similar structures already existing 
at the parent (e.g. the parent has its own by- laws).  Because the prospect of 
transaction cost savings motivated internalization in the first place, we 
should expect the redundancies to atrophy, particularly if special 
circumstances do not motivate the acquiring firm to maintain them.38
Here it is important to focus upon one of the central themes of 
substantive consolidation case law: when a subsidiary becomes the “alter 
ego” or “mere instrumentality” of the parent company, the environment is 
ripe for imposition of substantive consolidation.  The celebrated case of 
37
 The acquisition of shares often requires additional procedures such as preparation of 
disclosure materials, shareholder votes, director votes and government approvals, such as anti-
trust clearance from the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission.  Even with 
such additional procedures, acquisition by share purchase may have timing and other cost 
saving advantages over internal development of capacities. Similar procedures accompany an 
asset acquisition.
38
 The business combination between RJR and Nabisco provides an obvious example.  The 
parties went to great lengths to keep the asset partition created by the separate corporate forms 
in place so that potential tobacco litigation exposure in RJR did not spill over to Nabisco.  
Until recently, subsidiary corporations had an independent reason to keep up at least the 
charade of independence because a contract to cede control away from a corporation’s board 
of directors was void.  See, McQuade v. Stoneham and McGraw, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934); 
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, 781-788 (1986, Little Brown & Co.); accord
Expert Report of Jonathan R. Macey, infra note 170.
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Fish v. East39 provides a representative list of factors for determining when 
a substantial identity exists between parent and subsidiary.  Significantly, 
the listed factors could double as a “to do” list of cost saving steps to 
implement as part of internalizing production.  Consider how the Fish v. 
East factors translate into this list.
The acquiring corporation owns all the stock of the target company 
when a stock acquisition is selected to implement the decision to internalize 
production.  Typically, the acquiring company replaces the officers and 
directors of the target company with its own officers, making subsidiary 
management mirror that of the parent.40  To save costs, the acquiring 
company often centralizes capital raising and cash management activities.41
In many acquisitions, particularly the acquisition of a public company, the 
acquiring company will have formed its new subsidiary—a factor 
mentioned in Fish v. East that particularly concerns companies who 
internally create SPCs for securitization transactions.42  Though the 
acquiring company typically does not adopt as one of its goals the express 
strategy of leaving the target company with insufficient capital, the 
consolidated group has no incentive to monitor the level of capital within 
the newly acquired subsidiary because financing decisions are made at the 
parent level for the consolidated group as a whole.  Because the acquiring 
company made the acquisition to produce goods and services internally, the 
target company may have little or no business aside from providing 
39 See, e.g., Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940) (listing factors to consider 
because “[t]he determination as to whether a subsidiary is an instrumentality is primarily a 
question of fact and degree”). Factors cited include (a) the parent owns all or a majority of the 
capital stock of the subsidiary; (b) there are common directors and officers; (c) the parent 
corporation finances the subsidiary; (d) the parent corporation is responsible for incorporation 
of the subsidiary; (e) the subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital; (f) the parent company 
pays the salaries or expenses or losses of the subsidiary; (g) the subsidiary has no independent 
business from the parent; (h) the subsidiary is commonly referred to as a subsidiary or as a 
department or a division of the parent; (i) directors and executive officers of the subsidiary do 
not act independently but take direction from the parent; and (j) the formal legal requirements 
of the subsidiary as a separate and independent corporation are not observed.
40
 If the acquiring company is a public company, it typically does not insert outside directors 
onto the boards of its internal subsidiaries because, among other problems, such a move would 
increase the costs of internal decision making—the cost of providing information to outside 
directors being an example.
41
 Localized efficiencies gained from centralized capital raising activities are explored in 
William H. Widen, Lord of the Liens: Towards Greater Efficiency in Secured Syndicated 
Lending, 25 CARD. L. REV. 1577 (2004).
42
 This occurs when the acquiring company forms an acquisition subsidiary and makes a 
tender offer for the shares of the target company (assume a 91% tender condition).  After the 
acquisition subsidiary acquires 91% of the shares of the target, it effects a short form merger 
of the target into itself, squeezing out the minority shareholders of the target who did not 
tender their shares, with the acquisition company being the survivor in the merger.
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products to other members of the corporate group.  The new subsidiary 
often may be thought of as a division or department (and, in any event, will 
be identified as a subsidiary of the parent).  The directors and officers of the 
new subsidiary almost always take direction from the parent company, even 
when a complete overlap in personnel does not exist.  Lastly, formalities 
associated with internal asset transfers and corporate meetings typically 
suffer, with preparation of evidence of these transactions and meetings 
prepared (if at all), after the fact, by junior lawyers in law firms or on a 
general counsel’s staff.  The preparation of such documentation provides
good fodder for teaching young attorneys because the internal transactions 
often do not really matter—it is not like third party negotiations because 
mistakes easily can be fixed.
I do not mean to suggest that all acquiring companies purchase target 
companies, thus forming subsidiaries, for the transaction cost reduction 
reasons given in Coase’s model.  Subsidiaries may be formed internally for 
a variety of reasons43 or acquired externally simply for investment.  Nor do I 
mean to suggest that every acquiring company implements all the 
transaction cost reducing steps listed in Fish v. East. I do mean to suggest, 
however, that at the level of theory we should expect acquiring companies 
to take steps that create a substantial identity between the target and the 
acquiring company.
The economic theory predicts that growing firms will create the very 
environment that breeds substantive consolidation.  The empirical survey of 
use of substantive consolidation in large bankruptcies44 supports what this 
theory predicts.  The substantial identity between a parent company and its 
subsidiaries exists in a wide variety of cases precisely because creation of 
that identity of interest produces the very cost savings that motivated the 
construction of the consolidated corporate group in the first place.
The above remarks reveal potential context sensitivity to the corporate 
form in action.  When a corporation acts as a stand-alone investment vehicle 
or as a parent company, it performs several functions.  First, it creates a 
primary asset partition between its investors and creditors of the business it 
operates, providing a liability shield.  Second, the corporate form contains 
within its legal structure management and other mechanisms by which it 
43
 A firm might expand to achieve increased market power or monopoly status.  Expansion 
also may occur for less rational reasons, such as the desire of a CEO to empire build.  I do not 
suggest that Coase developed a complete theory of firm expansion.  However, to the extent 
the theory provides a partial explanation, we should expect to see the reduction of various 
internal capacities within subsidiary corporations as part of the cost savings achieved when a 
firm moves from external to internal product sourcing by acquiring a subsidiary.
44 See Prevalence of Substantive Consolidation, supra note 20.
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selects product, makes pricing decisions and bargains with third parties—
the features that make it an artificial person.
A third function of the corporate form lurks in the background: in both 
internal and external roles, the corporation allows for easy identification of a 
group of assets under a single name.  With any corporation, a variety of 
prior performative acts imbued with legal meaning, such as capital 
contributions and asset acquisitions, identified, collected and segregated
property under the single, convenient label of the corporate name.  When an 
acquiring company proceeds by stock acquisition, transaction cost savings 
accrue (which the parties presumably share in the process of negotiation) 
because the acquiring company buys a collection of assets simply by 
acquiring a name that represents the cumulative effect of prior transactions.  
The asset acquisition, in contrast, requires a reenactment of all the prior 
ceremonies of transfer and acquisition to identify, collect and segregate
those assets under a new name.
The convenience of asset identification in the initial stock acquisition, 
however, comes at a price.  When the consolidated group desires to transact 
business with external third parties involving property identified under a 
previously acquired subsidiary’s name, the convenience experienced in 
acquiring the assets becomes an inconvenient transaction cost.  The parent 
must then revive the artificial personality of the subsidiary to complete 
many transactions.  For example, if a third party wants to purchase an asset 
from a subsidiary or a bank wants a direct claim against the assets of the 
subsidiary through a guarantee or security interest, the parent must use the 
management functions of the subsidiary to authorize the sale, the guaranty 
or the grant of security.  This is particularly important in large transactions 
in which legal opinions must confirm the proper authority and enforceability 
of the transaction.45  This burden remains because, to the world outside the 
consolidated group, as a matter of property law the assets in the subsidiary 
remain governed by the name of the subsidiary.46  Transactions internal to 
45 In practice, I have been involved in numerous transactions in which (i) the parent could not 
provide a list of all its subsidiaries without extensive due diligence, (ii) the parent could not 
provide an accurate list of the officers and directors of its subsidiaries, (iii) when a list of 
officers and directors of subsidiaries was provided, many of the named individuals had retired 
or died, (iv) no share certificates existed bearing the current names of the subsidiaries (often 
because the subsidiaries were acquired in a merger), (v) when minute books could be found, 
the most recent entries were many years old and (vi) other similar lapses were present.  These 
issues all came up in the context of preparing opinions for transactions with third parties or 
preparing due diligence rooms for acquisitions.  Many of these transactions involved large, 
well known, investment grade companies that otherwise appeared to be well run.
46
 The problem is not simply overcome by merging the subsidiary into the parent because the 
merger itself may present many of the same transition related transaction cost issues raised by 
an acquisition through an asset sale.  Rather than incur certain transaction costs today (to 
facilitate a future transaction that may never come), parent companies often deal with the 
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the corporate group do not suffer from this liability; managers often neglect
these formalities when the discipline of external third party involvement
does not exert pressure for more costly formal procedures over less costly 
informal ones.47
In summary, we find three key functions performed by the corporate 
form: (i) asset partitioning, (ii) artificial personality, and (iii) asset 
identification.  All three functions operate actively when the corporation is 
independent.  When, however, the corporation becomes a subsidiary, active 
use of the artificial personality structures may largely cease.  Further, the 
asset identification function may suffer if internal transactions do not 
receive proper documentation.  A substantial identity between a parent and a 
subsidiary may exist because the artificial personality of the subsidiary is 
shut down or because systems of asset identification break down.
The above analysis poses a key question for our default rules governing 
the effect of use of the corporate form.  Should the legal effect of the 
corporate form be treated differently when a corporation exists as a 
subsidiary than when it exists as either a stand-alone company or a parent 
company?  In particular, should hibernation of the artificial personality 
structures or breakdown in the asset identification function adversely impact 
the asset partitioning function?  This, in essence, is the question posed by 
the doctrine of substantive consolidation.  However, the doctrine asks the 
question indirectly.  To see why this is so, we need to return to an old debate 
over whether treatment of the corporate form should be context sensitive or 
context neutral.
C. REVISITING AN OLD DEBATE OVER DEFAULT RULES
In the mid-1970’s, Professor Jonathan Landers proposed that the assets 
of each entity in a corporate group should be available to satisfy the 
creditors of any member of the corporate group; and, (then Professor)
Richard Posner objected.48  The Landers’ proposal amounts to a reversal of 
problems raised by the ongoing identification of assets to particular subsidiaries on a case by 
case basis only when confronted with an actual third party transaction.
47
 The presence of external auditors does not exert significant pressure because auditors 
typically certify only consolidated financial statements.  The consolidated financial statements 
may be materially correct even if the consolidating statements incorrectly locate particular 
assets within the consolidated group.
48 See Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate 
Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589 (1975); Richard A. Posner, The Rights of 
Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499 (1976); Jonathan M. Landers, 
Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in Bankruptcy, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 
(1976).  Landers’ proposal to make substantive consolidation of wholly owned companies the 
norm, rather than the exception, formed part of his comprehensive suggestion to restructure 
debtor-creditor relationships in the context of affiliated groups.  It included a proposal to 
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the current, context neutral default rule in which the assets of each entity are 
available to satisfy that entity’s creditors but not the creditors of other 
entities in the corporate group.  In effect, Landers proposed a law change 
providing for the mandatory substantive consolidation of members of a 
corporate group in a bankruptcy proceeding.  The Landers rule is context 
sensitive, altering the legal effect of the corporate form depending upon the 
environment in which it appears.
Judge Posner took strong issue with the proposal for its not being 
grounded in sound economic analysis of debtor-creditor relationships, 
concluding that, except in cases of misrepresentation, there was no good 
reason to adopt a default rule that collapsed separate legal entities into a 
single asset pool to satisfy creditors; further, he gave reasons to believe the 
opposite.  Landers responded that Posner’s economic analysis diverted him 
from the reality of actual cases in which benefits flow from having the law’s 
result mirror the reality of a single economic enterprise.
Judge Posner correctly framed the default rule issue presented by 
Professor Lander’s proposal to shift the presumption in consolidated groups 
to favor a substantive consolidation creating a form of enterprise liability:
The criterion of an efficient corporation law is therefore whether the terms do 
in fact reflect commercial realities, so that the transacting parties are generally 
content with them.  A corporation law that is out of step with those realities, 
and so induces contracting parties to draft waivers of the contract terms 
supplied by the law, is inefficient because it imposes unnecessary transaction 
costs.49
On the narrow issue, I must side with Judge Posner, but for a limited 
reason.  I am unable to say whether or not adopting Landers’ change in the 
default rule would save costs in any global or macro sense.  How many 
parties would need to contract around his new default rule, and how would 
those increased contracting costs compare to the costs of contracting around 
the existing default rule?  I am unable to make a guess, let alone a 
calculation.50  However, I can identify a context in which a strong case can 
be made that Landers’ proposed default rule would save costs—the 
subordinate the debt claims of affiliated companies to the debt claims of independent third 
parties.
49 See Posner, supra note 48, at 506.
50
 Judge Posner believed that the existing default rule respecting the asset partition of the 
corporate form could be shown more efficient by arguments explaining what rational debtors 
and creditors should prefer.  I am unprepared to argue for the efficiency of the existing 
scheme.  I simply do not believe that argument for a change can be based on global efficiency.  
For a discussion of epistemological problems with broad efficiency based arguments see 
William H. Widen, Spectres of Law & Economics, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1423 (2004).
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signature example being unsecured syndicated lending.  Ironically,
Professor Landers identified professional financiers51 as one class of 
creditor that did not need help from his enterprise liability theory precisely 
because they created substantive consolidation by contract using 
guarantees.52  Yet, in Owens Corning, we find a lending syndicate that, 
having contracted around the existing default rule to create a substantive
consolidation for the syndicate’s benefit, insists that substantive 
consolidation is inappropriate because of reliance on the very guarantees
that broke down the asset partition.
In fact, benefits might well accrue to lending syndicates and borrowers 
(who generally pay the lending syndicate’s legal fees) under the Landers 
regime.  When a lending syndicate makes a loan to a consolidated group of 
companies, it often requires guarantees from each member of the 
consolidated group so that the syndicate’s loan will not be structurally 
subordinated to the claims of the creditors of individual subsidiaries.  Such a 
lending syndicate could dispense with guarantees from the dozens, 
sometimes hundreds, of subsidiaries in a consolidated group.  The costs of 
(i) due diligence to identify the subsidiaries, (ii) corporate authorization to 
approve the guarantees, (iii) the documentation to evidence the guarantees, 
(iv) the legal opinions to confirm the effectiveness of the guarantees and (v) 
ongoing monitoring to make sure that required additional guarantees are 
provided, should make the Landers proposal attractive in some syndicated 
lending circles.  Also, the Landers regime would simplify negotiation of 
covenants restricting the extent to which a borrower might modify its 
internal structure.  Lastly, with the Landers proposal, the lending syndicate 
need not fear structural subordination if the borrower formed new 
subsidiaries and incurred debt that was structurally senior to the syndicate’s 
loans.
Professor Landers recognized that intercompany loan guarantees are 
nothing more than an attempt to contract around the existing default rule for 
corporate groups and replace that regime with his model of enterprise 
liability.  The contractual solution achieved by the guarantees is, however, 
51
 I say “professional financier” here, rather than the more modern “syndicated lender,” 
because modern syndicated lending did not begin until November 12, 1987, with Chemical 
Bank’s syndication of a $2,414,500,000 credit facility for H M Anglo-American, Ltd. and 
Imperial Investments (Grosvenor) Limited to acquire Kidde, Inc.  This transaction was the 
first of its kind, managed by James B. Lee, who is widely recognized as the father of modern 
syndicated finance.  See, e.g., Phillip L. Zweig, The New Stars of Finance, BUSINESSWEEK, 
Oct. 27, 1997, at __ (Noting that “[f]ew institutions have come further faster than Chase 
Manhattan Corp., thanks largely to its powerful head of investment banking, James B. Lee, 
44, who dominates the huge syndicated-loan business.”).
52 See Landers, supra note 48, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. at 531 n. 11.
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an approximation of Landers’ model, rather than a precise replication.53
Were Landers’ default rule adopted, then other creditor groups who might 
prefer the existing default rule would be forced to contract around the 
mandatory consolidation.54  One group that certainly would object to the 
new default rule is the securitization industry.  Securitization depends on the 
notion that the assets of a subsidiary, particularly of an SPC, remain 
separate from the assets of the parent and other consolidated group 
members.  Financiers to the SPC do not intend that the SPC’s assets remain 
available to creditors of other consolidated group members.  Just how an 
SPC might be confident that its affiliates had successfully contracted around 
Lander’s proposed default rule is unclear.55  Certain borrowers who 
structure their affairs around “internal capital markets” similarly might wish 
to contract around the proposed default rule.56
Though no legislative proposal is pending to enact Lander’s context 
sensitive default rule into corporate law,57 observe how the structure of the 
doctrine of substantive consolidation could, in effect, substantially 
implement the Landers proposal through the back door.  To imagine this 
scenario you need only assume two things: first, that imposition of 
substantive consolidation is proper upon a simple showing that a substantial 
identity exists between a parent company and its subsidiary; and, second, 
that this substantial identity is widespread because the pursuit of transaction 
cost savings motivates consolidated groups to produce this substantial 
53
 A main difference between the status quo and the enterprise liability scheme is the 
treatment of involuntary creditors, such as tort claimants, who do not have a chance to 
negotiate around a particular default rule.  Recoveries for such creditors necessarily differ 
under the two schemes.
54
 Under the Landers regime, a debtor in a consolidated group would need to insist upon a 
liability waiver from each of its creditors to absolve the other group members of liability and 
vice versa.  This procedure would not be available for limitation of the scope of liability for 
tort claimants.  Further, the Landers proposal potentially creates federal income tax problems 
for consolidated groups with foreign subsidiaries because, under current law, if a foreign 
subsidiary guarantees the debt of its U.S. parent, the guarantee creates a deemed dividend.  
See I.R.C. § 956 (Code year).
55
 Professor Landers does contemplate that demonstration of reliance might provide an 
exception to his general scheme of enterprise liability.  Perhaps an SPC would demonstrate 
this reliance.  At the time of his debate with Posner, the securitization industry did not exist.
56 See George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries 
of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1102 (2004).
57
 In contexts other than corporation law, legislatures already have enacted a version of the 
Landers proposal, imposing a form of enterprise liability on corporate groups to pay federal 
income taxes and pension liabilities.  The Supreme Court has resisted imposing enterprise 
liability in the context of environmental laws, absent a showing that factors justifying 
traditional corporate law veil piercing are present.  See U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
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identity. If I have made the case that significant numbers of large American 
corporate groups carry the substantive consolidation “virus,” then the 
contours of substantive consolidation doctrine become extremely important.
To be clear, my first assumption above is largely a myth.  For the most 
part, courts do not hold that imposition of substantive consolidation doctrine 
is proper simply because the subsidiary is the alter ego or mere 
instrumentality of the parent, but some courts come close to this standard.  
Nevertheless, the securitization market behaves as if this simple test might 
apply; judicial rhetoric certainly does not discourage this fear.  I will use the 
simple test of substantial identity as the benchmark against which to gauge 
the actual tests that courts use.  The closer a test comes to this benchmark, 
the closer we find ourselves to a de facto judicial enactment of the Landers 
proposal.
The currently recognized justifications for imposition of substantive 
consolidation divide into two camps.  The first justification rationalizes use 
of the doctrine on considerations of efficiency and necessity.  The second
justification rationalizes use of the doctrine on grounds based in corporate 
law veil piercing, so long as its use does not destroy some reliance interest. 
Both approaches may appear in a single case.  Courts often state tests as a 
combination of these two justifications, creating needless confusion in the 
process.
III.  DUELING STANDARDS FOR SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION
A. THE VIEW FROM THE MARKET
Substantive consolidation opinions issued by law firms,58 going back to 
the 1980’s, acknowledge and discuss two traditionally recognized and 
distinct rationales for use of substantive consolidation.  These opinions 
present a good starting point for analysis because they reveal how the 
securitization market views the doctrine.  These views represent a 
tremendous investment in research on the doctrine of substantive 
consolidation, undertaken by numerous law firms, investment banks and 
rating agencies.  The securitization industry has structured and sold trillions 
of dollars of financing on the hope that its understanding of the doctrine 
allows the creation of bankruptcy remote SPCs not subject to the risk of
substantive consolidation.  My account of these market views derives from 
58
 Law firms typically render substantive consolidation legal opinions to a rating agency (such 
as Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s) to support the award of a high investment grade credit 
rating to a financing structure.  The rating agency wants to know whether a special purpose 
subsidiary corporation will remain separate from its parent company should the parent 
company find itself in bankruptcy proceedings.  Transaction participants often refer to the 
opinion as a “non-consolidation letter.”
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practice experience during which I was one of the principal drafters and 
reviewers of non-consolidation legal opinions at my firm.59
What I consider the modern rationale for substantive consolidation 
surfaces in Second Circuit cases.60  These cases stress that substantive 
consolidation is proper in cases of hopeless entanglement of financial affairs 
of the subject companies.  Given hopeless entanglement, all creditors might 
benefit from substantive consolidation rather than spending funds to 
disentangle the mess.  In some cases, it may be impossible to separate the 
financial affairs of members of a corporate group.  Spending funds to 
attempt the impossible makes little sense.  In other cases, the 
disentanglement might be possible, but so expensive that it dramatically 
reduces, or eliminates altogether, the return to creditors.  Whether based on 
necessity or simply cost savings, this justification relies on economic 
efficiency to support use of substantive consolidation.
The former Bankruptcy Act and the current Bankruptcy Code both 
reflect the important goal of cost reduction.61  The rhetoric of “hopeless 
entanglement” links directly to the idea of substantial identity.  The 
entanglement metaphor, however, relates primarily to the failure to maintain 
business records that properly identify assets to particular corporate names, 
and not to destruction of artificial personality.
59
 To avoid misunderstanding, though my views derive from practice experience, they 
represent solely my own interpretation and not the views of any law firm or company.
60 See Union Savings Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988); Flora 
Mir Corp. v. Dickson & Co., 432 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1970); Chemical Bank v. Kheel, 369 
F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966); see also Commercial Envelope Mfg., 3 B.C.D. 647 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1977); accord Reider v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re Reider), 31 F.3d 1102, 1105-06 (11th 
Cir. 1994).  The Second Circuit introduced the term “substantive consolidation.”  See In re
Cont’l Vending Mach. Corp., 517 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1975).
61
 The general goal of the Bankruptcy Act was to enhance recoveries for creditors both by 
increasing the assets available to the estate (by, for example, recovering preferential transfers 
and fraudulent conveyances) and by minimizing costs incurred by the estate.  See Otte v. U.S., 
419 U.S. 43, 53 (1974) (noting “an overriding concern in the Act with keeping the fees and 
administrative expenses at a minimum so as to preserve as much of the estate as possible for 
the creditors”); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966) (observing that legislative history 
indicates that Congress gave special consideration making the bankruptcy laws inexpensive in 
their administration).  Historically, the cost reduction concern was a paramount factor 
affecting the debates over the structure of our bankruptcy laws.  See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., 
DEBT’S DOMINION, A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 40 (2001) (discussing 
concern over costs in the debates on the 1898 Act).  Concerns over cost minimization continue 
under the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 US 513, 517 n.1 
(1984) (noting that Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code “with the intention that business 
reorganizations should  be quicker and more efficient ...”) (citing HR Rep. No. 595, 5 (1977)); 
9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1001 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed., rev. 2005).  The 
Bankruptcy Rules also reflect the policy of cost minimization.  See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1001 
(“These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 
every case and proceeding”).
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The second rationale for substantive consolidation traces its origins to 
veil piercing doctrine62 and dicta in a Supreme Court case.63  In a corporate 
veil piercing action, creditors of a corporation assert liability against the 
shareholders of the corporation.  The creditors seek to break down the wall 
of limited liability that exists between a corporation and its creditors, on the 
one hand, and the shareholders, on the other hand.  The corporate form has, 
as one of its primary functions, the role of insulating the shareholders from 
the creditors of the corporation by forming an asset partition, shielding 
personal assets from business activity risks.64  In the classic case of asset 
partitioning by corporate form, we conceive of individual natural persons as 
the protected shareholder class.  Investment in the corporation presents the 
extent and limit of an individual’s exposure to risk of particular business 
activity.
In the veil piercing action, plaintiffs allege that the corporation is either 
the “alter ego” or a “mere instrumentality” of the shareholders, as evidenced 
by failure to observe corporate formalities.  If shareholders did not respect 
the corporate form, then that form should not act as a liability shield for
shareholders against the corporation’s creditors.65  Significantly, classic veil 
piercing doctrine requires a showing of some connection between the failure 
to respect corporate form and harm suffered by the veil piercing 
proponent.66  Substantive consolidation doctrine applies this theory of 
respect for corporate form within the corporate group, recognizing that a 
parent company functions as shareholder for its subsidiary, just as an 
individual may function as shareholder for a single corporation.  If factors 
exist to support veil piercing outside of bankruptcy, then they also support 
62 See Stone v. Eacho (In re Tip Top Tailors, Inc.), 127 F.2d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 1942); Fish v. 
East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940).  The veil piercing rationale continued into the 
1960s, see Soviero v. Franklin Nat’l Bank, 328 F.2d 446, 448 (2d Cir. 1964), and the 1970s, 
see In re Cont’l Vending Mach. Corp., 517 F.2d at 997, while the modern economic efficiency 
rationale was being developed.  By borrowing from state veil piercing doctrine to formulate 
substantive consolidation, Bankruptcy law, in essence, developed a federal version of 
corporate law to use in insolvency cases.  Today, the economic efficiency rationale and the 
veil piercing rationale for substantive consolidation co-exist.  One study measures the 
significance of the doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil” outside the substantive 
consolidation context.  See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical 
Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991).
63 See Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941).
64 See Hansmann & Kraakman supra note 11.
65
 I note those aspects of veil piercing that apply most directly to substantive consolidation 
doctrine.  Comprehensive attempts to understand the justification for veil piercing exist that 
emphasize multiple factors and considerations, including undercapitalization of corporations 
and fraudulent transfers to shareholders.  See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, The Duties of the 
Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1977).
66 See, e.g., 1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORP. § 43 (2005).
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substantive consolidation in bankruptcy.
Typically, veil piercing involves “upstream” claims by corporate 
creditors against shareholders.67 In a substantive consolidation, direction 
does not matter: through a request for substantive consolidation, creditors of 
a parent may seek a direct claim against assets of a subsidiary (a 
downstream move), creditors of a subsidiary may seek a direct claim against 
assets of a parent (an upstream move) or creditors of one subsidiary may 
seek a direct claim against assets of another sister subsidiary (a lateral 
move).  Disappointed creditors simply follow the assets in an attempt to 
enhance their recoveries, with simultaneous moves in all directions
permitted.
In a veil piercing action, disappointed creditors of the corporation seek 
assets of a shareholder, while existing creditors of the shareholder are 
unable to share in the assets of the corporation.  The corporate creditors 
typically have exhausted company assets and, remaining unsatisfied in the 
process, thereafter seek recovery from the shareholder, competing with 
existing creditors of the shareholder.  In contrast, a substantive 
consolidation provides that creditors of the various companies share pooled 
assets on a pari passu basis, absent court imposed subordination.68
In a consolidated group, the parent company forms the primary asset 
partition between individual shareholders and creditors of group members.  
Courts tend to respect this primary separation between individual investors 
and corporate group creditors even if they ignore the various asset partitions 
created by subsidiaries within the consolidated group.  Thus, substantive 
consolidation within the corporate group typically does not also lead to a 
veil piercing action against shareholders.  This pattern appears, not 
surprisingly, with particular force when the parent company has a large, 
widely dispersed investor base.
The veil piercing justification for substantive consolidation is 
particularly important for understanding the current state of the doctrine. 
Veil piercing cases supply the seemingly endless list of factors that courts 
recite to justify substantive consolidation.  These factors often appear as 
simple laundry lists, without separation of the important from the relatively 
minor, creating a justified impression of under-theorized chaos.69  When 
67
 Though the upstream move provides the general pattern for veil piercing cases, examples of 
reverse veil piercing, in which creditors of a shareholder attempt to reach assets of the 
corporation, do exist.  See, e.g., Goldberg v. Engleberg, 92 P. 2d 935 (1939).
68
 For classic presentations of equitable subordination, see Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co. 
(Deep Rock), 306 U.S. 307 (1939); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
69
 In this respect I am in complete agreement with the academic brief filed with the Third 
Circuit in Owens Corning.  See supra note 19.
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importing these factors into the substantive consolidation context, courts 
often forget the traditional veil piercing requirement that misuse of the 
corporate form contribute to a harm.  The veil piercing rationale for 
substantive consolidation finds itself distanced from its origins, creating the 
risk that a simple finding of substantial identity might trigger a substantive 
consolidation.  To make matters worse, courts often combine the economic 
rationale with the (often scaled down) veil piercing rationale.
B. THE MUDDLE IN THE COURTS
Consideration of the two most celebrated articulations of substantive 
consolidation doctrine illustrates the case law confusion between the 
economic rationale and the veil piercing rationale.  In Union Savings Bank 
v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co.,70 the court states the test as follows: “[first]
whether creditors dealt with the entities as a single economic unit and ‘did 
not rely on their separate identity in extending credit’ . . . or [second]
whether the affairs of the debtors are so entangled that consolidation will 
benefit all creditors.”71  Though the court clearly contemplates a disjunctive 
test, the first “veil piercing” branch allows substantive consolidation without 
a prior finding that the remedy is needed to correct an identified “wrong,”
though it adds to the “single economic unit” requirement that a reliance 
interest not be destroyed.  In approving the Augie/Restivo test,72 the Third 
Circuit’s Owens Corning test suffers from this defect.  The second 
“economic” rationale in Augie/Restivo retains a link to the requirement of 
substantial identity with its metaphor of entanglement, but it grafts onto that 
notion the requirement of an economic benefit to all creditors.  Substantial 
identity figures in both branches of the test.
In contrast, the test in In re Auto-Train Corp.73 requires the substantive 
consolidation proponent to make two showings: first, that a substantial 
identity exists between the entities to be consolidated and second, that 
consolidation is necessary to avoid some harm or realize some benefit.  If 
the proponent makes these showings, the court may order substantive 
consolidation if it finds that the demonstrated benefits of consolidation 
“heavily” outweigh the harm.74  The Auto-Train test mixes the economic 
70 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988).
71 Id. at 518.
72
 419 F.3d at 210.
73
 810 F.2d 270, 276 (C.A.D.C. 1987).
74
 In an alternate version of this test used by the lower court in Owens Corning, the question 
does not become whether the benefits heavily outweigh the harm but, rather, whether an 
objecting creditor relied on the separate credit of one of the entities to be consolidated and 
whether that creditor will be prejudiced by the consolidation.  If reliance and prejudice are 
shown, then the consolidation is not proper.  See 316 B.R. at 171.
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rationale with the veil piercing rationale, and, in the process, sanctions a 
pure wealth transfer from one creditor class to another creditor class on 
mere economic grounds.  Further, the balancing of benefit against harm is 
inconsistent with Augie/Restivo’s notion of “benefit to all creditors.”
Understanding fully the two justifications for use of substantive 
consolidation requires a distinction between two types of creditor “harm.”
The first type occurs whenever a creditor experiences a “decreased 
distribution” in consolidation. The second type occurs whenever a creditor 
is “wronged.”  A wrong results when a court defeats a creditor’s reasonable
reliance on the separate existence of a particular legal entity.  This happens 
when a court interferes with a specific contract right that a creditor enjoys
that protects the separate legal status of the entity relied upon.  Such a right 
does not exist merely because a creditor has contracted with a particular 
debtor because a creditor does not, in the usual case, have a right to prevent 
a debtor from entering into business combinations.75  Specific contract 
protection of separateness must exist for reliance in this sense.
On this analysis, substantive consolidation does not produce a “wrong” 
simply because the consolidation produces a wealth transfer.  The two types 
of “harm” are distinct.  The Third Circuit’s Owens Corning decision 
strongly supports this proposition.  In Owens Corning, if the presence of a 
wealth transfer were sufficient to defeat substantive consolidation, the 
estimated $1 billion wealth transfer from the syndicated lenders to the 
unsecured noteholders and other parent creditors would have created a 
simple bar to use of the doctrine.  Instead of relying on this wealth transfer, 
the Third Circuit believed it needed to find separate creditor reliance on the
individual guarantors.  Without this reliance, the lower court’s imposition of 
substantive consolidation would have been proper despite the wealth 
transfer.
C. AN EXAMPLE OF MISPLACED RELIANCE
I am confident that the Third Circuit made an error in Owens Corning
by finding loan syndicate reliance on inter-company guarantees (despite the 
amicus support from the Loan Syndications and Trading Association).76 A
lending syndicate typically employs a web of inter-company guarantees 
defensively, rather than offensively.  A defensive use of inter-company 
guarantees insures that no subsidiary creditor has structural seniority over 
the syndicate’s loans.77 This protection allows the syndicate confidently to 
75 See infra note 79.
76
 The Loan Syndications and Trading Association is the industry association that advances 
the interests of lenders participating in the syndicated lending market.
77
 The structure of syndicated lending and its use of guarantees is explained in William H. 
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rely upon consolidated financial statements and consolidated financial tests 
to monitor the corporate group as a single economic unit. Testimony from 
lending syndicate representatives suggest this defensive use in the Owens 
Corning credit agreement, though the Third Circuit drew the opposite 
conclusion from its understanding of what it called “Lending 101.”78
A lending syndicate uses corporate form to insure a priority position—
an offensive posture—only when it takes affirmative steps to insure that the 
asset partitions created by the separate corporate forms within the  
consolidate group remain in place for the life of their loans.  Offensive use 
requires extra steps because the general corporate law rule holds that a 
creditor may not oppose a consolidation or merger.79  If lenders do not want 
their borrower engaging in business combinations, they must contractually 
prohibit them.  For example, if lenders make loans to a stand-alone 
company but do not want the loans to continue if their borrower becomes a 
subsidiary of another company, they include a “change in control” default in 
their loan agreement.  This accelerates the maturity of the loan upon 
acquisition of the borrower.  Similarly, if lenders make loans to a particular 
subsidiary within a corporate group and they want that loan to function as a 
stand-alone credit, the lenders prohibit the merger, consolidation or
dissolution of that subsidiary. A lender might require a pledge of shares of 
a subsidiary to further insure the integrity of the asset partition.80 The most 
extensive affirmative steps to insure integrity of an asset partition occur in 
securitization transactions because the asset partition between the SPC and 
Widen, Lord of the Liens: Towards Greater Efficiency in Secured Syndicated Lending, 25 
CARD. L. REV. 1577 (2004).
78 Compare 419 F.3d at 212 with In re Owens Corning, Case Nos 00-03837 to 3854 (JKF), 
Post-Hearing Brief in Support of Substantive Consolidation, 52-73 (Aug. 6, 2004) (excerpting 
lender testimony).  For example, a lead credit officer supervising the loan agreement testified 
that the only purpose of the guarantees was to avoid structural subordination.  Id. at 57.
79 See, e.g., Cole v. Nat’l Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (1931) (stating “it is 
not permitted to a creditor of a corporation to prevent its merger or consolidation with another 
if the statutory law of its creation authorizes it”).  Significantly, in the merger in Cole, the 
financial condition of the combined company was less sound, as evidenced by its quick ratio, 
than the prior stand alone company against which the complaining creditor had a claim.
The fact that the quick asset condition of the consolidated company will, in relation 
to its liabilities, render it less desirable as a debtor from the viewpoint of current 
financial soundness than the constituent debtor, if true as alleged, cannot serve to 
justify an enjoining of the consolidation on the creditor's complaint.
Id. at 186.  The court's reasoning depended, in part, on the notion that the creditor retained a 
claim against the combined entity, which included a claim against the assets of the former 
company as well as a claim against additional assets of its merger partner.
80
 Courts have found substantive consolidation improper if consolidation destroys the benefits 
of a pledge of subsidiary shares unless a priority is given to the holder of the pledge.  See, e.g., 
FDIC v. Hogan (In re Gulfco Inv. Corp.), 593 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1979).
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other consolidated group members must survive to an investment grade 
level of certainty.
The Third Circuit found that the lending syndicate in Owens Corning
intended an offensive web of guarantees to afford it a priority (rather than 
merely to assure it a defensive parity) because it interpreted the loan 
agreement to prohibit the merger of subsidiaries with the parent.  The lower 
court did not provide a specific interpretation of the merger covenant in its 
opinion, though it found an absence of creditor reliance.81  My reading of 
the loan agreement leads me to believe that the Owens Corning subsidiaries 
could merge with both themselves and with the parent, though in fairness to 
the Third Circuit, the drafting could have been clearer.82
Regardless of the presence or absence of a merger prohibition, the loan
agreement does not prohibit either the liquidation or the dissolution of the 
subsidiary companies into the parent, nor would it have prohibited all the 
subsidiaries from forming a general partnership with the parent—a move 
equally devastating to a corporate asset partition.  In fact, so long as no
material adverse effect resulted to the consolidated group, the only entity 
that had to maintain its corporate existence to avoid default is the parent 
company.83  I suspect the court did not consider these alternate structural 
81
 At the hearing, Judge Wollin remarked that he found Section 8.09 “potentially ambiguous,” 
though Judge Fullam authored the lower court opinion.  See Brief in Support, supra note 78.
82
 The prohibition on mergers appears in Section 8.09 of the credit agreement and provides:
B. Negative Covenants. The Company shall not, and shall not permit any Subsidiary 
to, directly or indirectly: . . .
Section 8.09 Mergers, Consolidations and Acquisitions. (a) Merge or consolidate 
with any Person, except for, if after giving effect thereto no Default would exist, (i) 
the Merger, (ii) any merger or consolidation of the Company or any Subsidiary with 
any other Person; provided that (A) the Company or such Subsidiary, as the case 
may be, shall be the continuing Person, and (B) in the case of a merger or 
consolidation with any Subsidiary, the other Person shall not be a Subsidiary, (iii) 
any merger or consolidation of any Subsidiary that is not a Loan Party with and into 
any one or more other Subsidiaries, and (iv) any merger or consolidation of any 
Subsidiary that is a Loan Party with any one or more other Subsidiaries that are Loan 
Parties.
See Owens Corning Form 10Q—Quarterly report (accepted July 24, 1997), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/75234/0000075234-97- 000012-index.html.
83
 My interpretation of the merger prohibition is strengthened by the covenant requiring the 
Company and its Subsidiaries to maintain corporate existence.  The Company (i.e. Owens 
Corning) must maintain its corporate existence but no default occurs if any subsidiary fails to 
do so provided that the failure does not result in a material adverse effect on the consolidated 
group.  The provision provides in relevant part:
A. Affirmative Covenants. The Company shall and shall cause each Subsidiary to:
 Section 8.01 Preservation of Existence and Properties, Scope of Business, 
Compliance With Law, Payment of Taxes and Claims. (a) Preserve and maintain its 
corporate existence and all of its other franchises, licenses, rights and privileges, . . . 
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possibilities because substantive consolidation so often is compared simply 
to a merger (though the procedure bears equal analogy to dissolutions and 
consolidations). Yet, because of these alternatives, the syndicate could not 
properly have relied on the continued separate existence of the subsidiaries 
to provided advantage.  I find the lending syndicate’s claim of reliance on 
fragile and unprotected asset partitions inside bankruptcy implausible when 
those very partitions might have been eliminated without penalty outside 
bankruptcy.
Under the Owens Corning loan agreement only subsidiaries with assets 
of $30 million or more provided guarantees.  The Third Circuit apparently 
viewed this threshold as further evidence of affirmative lender reliance, 
similar to specifying collateral coverage for a loan. The specification of a 
$30 million limit, in this context, does nothing of the sort.  In the case of 
collateral amounts, the lender typically seeks a particular loan to collateral 
value ratio for which the dollar values of particular assets are crucial.  A 
casual review of the financial covenants in the Owens Corning credit 
agreement reveals that the lenders structured a cash flow deal, not an asset 
coverage deal—no specific dollar amount of guarantee value supports 
outstanding loan amounts.84
The $30 million limit likely arose as a compromise between protection 
for the lending syndicate and limitation of internal monitoring costs for 
Owens Corning.  Often corporate groups form subsidiaries for minor 
purposes, such as reserving corporate names in a particular jurisdiction.  
Any top level manager who monitors a credit agreement typically would be 
unaware of such small matters.  Further, the person forming the subsidiary 
would not be aware of the terms of a loan agreement that required
guarantees from “all” subsidiaries.  Yet, top managers periodically must 
certify to the lending syndicate that the borrower is in compliance with the 
terms of its loan agreement.85  A $30 million guarantee threshold is low 
except that this Section 8.01 (other than clause (a), in so far as it requires the 
Company to preserve its corporate existence . . .) shall not apply in any circumstance 
where noncompliance, either singly or together with all other incidents of non-
compliance, would not have a Materially Adverse Effect on the Company and the 
Consolidated Subsidiaries taken as a whole. Id.
84
 Though I am critical of the Third Circuit’s understanding of syndicated lending, I have great 
sympathy for their predicament.  The Third Circuit is not the first court, nor will it be the last, 
that fails to understand a complex financial transaction and the context in which it was made.  
Counsel for the lending syndicate did a masterful job of eliciting, and then working with, 
testimony in which syndicate managers acknowledged that a natural consequence of using 
guarantees was to create possible priorities for the lending syndicate.
85
 Kenneth Lay, formerly of Enron, faces 11 counts in an indictment, 4 of which assert that he 
made false statements to banks from whom he had made margin borrowings.  This criminal 
indictment merely highlights why members of management take care to avoid making false 
statements to lending syndicates.
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enough to give the lending syndicate practical comfort that it has a direct 
claim on most of the assets of the consolidated group yet it is high enough 
to comfort top managers that they will not be forced to make false 
certifications about loan agreement compliance.  Far from the $30 million 
number functioning as a surrogate for collateral, it simply represents a 
compromise between competing concerns in the context of breaking down 
an asset partition.
Another way of looking at the situation is to recognize that, if the 
provision of subsidiary guarantees had no cost, the lending syndicate would 
have required them from all entities in the consolidated group because such 
a scheme would provide a complete match between the assets on the 
consolidated balance sheet (which the lending syndicate uses to monitor the 
credit) and the assets against which the lending syndicate might assert a pari 
passu claim.86
Many debtors will enter bankruptcy with unsecured inter-company 
guarantees in place.  Owens Corning gives lending syndicates holding 
guarantees a veto right over any plan of reorganization that proposes use of 
substantive consolidation to implement the plan.  The Third Circuit’s 
decision changes the structure of negotiations in cases where inter-company 
guarantees are present, giving a veto right to powerful economic players 
who did not rely on the guarantee to provide priority.  When a priority based 
on corporate form is intended to be relied upon, lending syndicates do not 
rely on naked guarantees.  Professional financiers require more.
Significantly, creditworthy borrowers resist providing security interests and 
limiting their ability to manage internal corporate structure, believing a 
good credit rating entitles them access to the credit markets with limited 
restrictions.  Whenever a borrower grants a security interest or agrees to 
overly restrictive covenants, it sends the market a message of financial 
weakness.
Before the Third Circuit’s decision in Owens Corning, I can confidently 
say that no sophisticated lending syndicate ever relied on a mere covenant 
prohibiting merger, consolidation or dissolution to create priority when the 
syndicate itself employed a web of guarantees. The reason for non-reliance 
on such covenants is simple.  The market believed that the presence of inter-
company guarantees virtually assured that imposition of substantive 
consolidation would be proper for any companies forming part of an inter-
company guarantee web (and no competent counsel would have opined 
86
 A significant exception to this general principle is the provision of guarantees by foreign 
subsidiaries.  For federal income tax reasons, lenders typically do not require guarantees from 
foreign subsidiaries when they exist in a consolidated group because the guarantee results in a 
deemed dividend.  See I.R.C. § 956 (Code year).
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otherwise).87 In Owens Corning, rather than being presented with a bona 
fide case of reliance on asset partitions, we have a case of musical chairs in 
which the lending syndicate found a seat when the music stopped.
My critique of the Third Circuit’s approach in Owens Corning does not 
follow simply from the court’s imperfect understanding of lending practices 
but from my own analysis of how substantive consolidation doctrine should 
be reformulated.  I turn now to that reformulation, focusing first on 
economic justifications for substantive consolidation and then to the veil 
piercing rationale.  Lastly, I formulate a new rationale for substantive 
consolidation based on traditional fairness considerations.
IV. THE EFFICIENCY PROMOTION RATIONALE
In a classic substantive consolidation, multiple related companies 
appear in a procedurally consolidated bankruptcy proceeding.  Typically, a 
parent company owns one or more subsidiary companies.  A simple 
arithmetic example illustrates the different economic results with and 
without a consolidation.
Legal Entities Asset Values Big Bank Factor Co. Local Bank
A $750 $1000 -0- -0- 
B $500 -0- $1000 -0- 
C $250 -0- -0- $1000
Consolidated $1500 $1000 $1000 $1000
Suppose Company A owes Big Bank $1000 and owns assets worth 
$750, Company B owes Factor Co. $1000 and owns assets worth $500 and 
Company C owes Local Bank $1000 and owns assets worth $250.  In the 
absence of a substantive consolidation, Big Bank would receive 75% of its 
claim, Factor Co. would receive 50% of its claim and Local Bank would 
receive 25% of its claim.  Upon the substantive consolidation of the three 
companies, the aggregate of $3000 in claims would be satisfied from the 
common pool of $1500 in assets, with each creditor receiving 50% of its 
claim.  Only Factor Co. is indifferent to substantive consolidation.  Big 
Bank is harmed and Local Bank is benefited.  Substantive consolidation 
almost always takes money from one creditor to pay another creditor in a 
world without transaction costs.  In the simple model, substantive 
consolidation is a zero sum game.  This situation potentially changes when 
the transaction costs of gathering information are factored into the model.
87 See, e.g., Eastgroup Properties v. Southern Motel Assoc., Ltd., 935 F.2d 245 (11th Cir. 
1991); Bruce Energy Ctr. Ltd. v. Orfa Corp. of Am. (In re Orfa Corp. of Philadelphia), 129 
B.R. 404 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991); In re Amereco Envtl. Servs., Inc., 125 B.R. 566 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 1991); In re Manzey Land & Cattle Co., 17 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1982); In re
Snider Bros. Inc., 18 B.R. 230 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); In re Commercial Envelope Mfg. Co., 
No 76 B2354, 1977 Bankr. LEXIS 15, at *15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1977).
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The question of substantive consolidation typically arises when a court 
and the parties are unsure about the allocation of assets and liabilities among 
the subject companies.  Substantive consolidation offers an inexpensive
alternative to generating balance sheets for each individual company in a 
consolidated group of companies.  Dispensing with the accounting and other 
procedures to generate separate balance sheets potentially saves transaction 
costs, leaving more assets available for distribution to creditors.
I identify below four different scenarios that emerge from this 
discussion and label them: Necessity, Pareto, Kaldor-Hicks and Wealth 
Transfer.
A. THE NECESSITY SCENARIO
Courts often employ rhetoric of “necessity” to justify use of substantive 
consolidation.  When the facts of a case reflect extremely poor record 
keeping, a failure to observe company formalities, and similar deficiencies, 
this rhetoric actually may match a situation of true impossibility that 
forensic accountants are unable to reconstruct.  The asset identification 
function within the consolidated group has broken down.  The only practical 
alternative appears to be a pooling of the assets of the subject companies 
and the pro rata satisfaction of third party creditors from a common fund.88
I consider such a situation a proper one for use of the “necessity” rhetoric.
In true cases of necessity, poor record keeping and failure to observe 
corporate formalities may explain the break down in the asset identification 
function.  However, such shortcomings should not be seen, in themselves, 
as reasons for imposition of substantive consolidation on the grounds of 
necessity.89
88
 I term a pro rata distribution the “only” practical alternative based on my assumption of 
what distributional schemes will satisfy collective notions of fairness.  In cases of shortage, 
allocation of available resources, pro rata based on the amount of the claim, has broad appeal.  
I trace the notion at least back to Jeremy Bentham:
“The loss of a portion of wealth will produce a loss of happiness to each individual, 
more or less great, according to the proportion between the portion he loses and the 
portion he retains.  Take away the fourth part of his fortune, and you take away the 
fourth part of his happiness; and so of the rest.”
JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE, PART 1, OBJECTS OF THE CIVIL 
LAW, CHAPTER 6. 
This notion has grounding in the principle of average utility which directs society to maximize 
the average utility per capita rather than total utility.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 162 (1971).  Other schemes might be advanced, such as a lottery with the winner 
being paid first, in full, with those holding higher numbers paid in order until funds were 
exhausted.  In lieu of a lottery to determine order of payment, one might adopt a temporal 
priority by paying either the oldest or the most recent claims first.
89
 Some fear that poor record keeping and failure to observe corporate formalities may 
constitute separate and independent grounds for imposition of substantive consolidation.  I 
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Though I use the inability to reconstruct financial records as my 
paradigm case of necessity, courts might be confronted with other forms of 
necessity presented by a complex business form.  In the ongoing Adelphia 
bankruptcy case,90 one party requested that each individual debtor in the 
procedurally consolidated cases be represented by an independent fiduciary 
and an independent counsel.91  As consolidated group members in large 
bankruptcies often number in the hundreds or the thousands, the sheer
complexity of consolidated group structure may overtax the professional 
resources available to manage procedurally consolidated cases on an entity 
by entity basis.  Indeed, one suspects that the creditor in Adelphia requested 
separate entity representation to create negotiation leverage equal to the 
increased costs and disruption that granting such a request would create.
Though I do not find case law disagreement over use of substantive 
consolidation in situations of strong necessity, two practical problems lurk 
behind the analysis: (i) the poor quality of corporate recordkeeping92 and (ii) 
the magnitude of particular recordkeeping problems in relation to the actual 
effect on creditors caused by imposition of substantive consolidation.
In practice, I have found business recordkeeping often quite poor,93
even in well run businesses.  Many courts considering substantive 
consolidation will be able to conclude that it is, in some sense, “impossible” 
to accurately identify the assets and liabilities of consolidated group
members.  To effect a separation, a court may need to draw arbitrary lines to 
establish the levels of inter-company payables and receivables—to decide 
which asset transfer was a loan, which asset transfer was a capital 
contribution and which asset transfer was a dividend.  Unless courts require 
something short of perfection for entity separation, almost any business 
situation might support imposition of substantive consolidation on necessity
grounds.94
argue that such failures do not justify ignoring the separate entity form unless one of my three 
rationales for substantive consolidation is met.
90 In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 333 B.R. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
91 Id. at 665.
92
 It would not surprise me to find that insolvent companies, on average, have less 
comprehensive and accurate record keeping than solvent companies and that poor 
recordkeeping might contribute to the poor financial condition by providing management with 
less information.  However, I do not know that to be the case and, accordingly, I am not 
suggesting an independent penalty for failure to keep a clean corporate house.  Certainly, 
some recordkeeping might be inefficient as Coase’s model suggests.
93 Accord David Wessel, Wall Street Is Cleaning Derivatives Mess, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 
2006, at A2 (describing 18,000 undocumented credit derivatives trades).
94
 I do not mean to suggest that such matters need to be proven “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
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Unfortunately, the case law does not give much guidance on the extent 
to which a court should allow parties and their accountants to fill gaps in 
order to create the separate books and records needed to administer separate 
bankruptcy estates.  Though pure creative writing should not suffice, what 
type of evidence should pass muster?95
The recordkeeping problem looms large in any case in which the range 
of the uncertainty related to settling inter-company accounts is small in 
relation to the estimated distributional effect on third party creditors caused 
by a substantive consolidation.  A simple arithmetic example illustrates this 
point.  Suppose that A Co. owns $100 of tangible assets and owes Local 
Bank $1000, while B Co. owns $500 of tangible assets and owes Big Bank 
$1000.  If we analyze this situation before consideration of inter-company 
balances, we find that imposition of substantive consolidation is a boon to 
Local Bank and a disaster for Big Bank.
This situation may not change much if we set reliable upper and lower 
bounds on the amount of net inter-company payables and receivables. For 
example, suppose that, as an historical matter, A Co. and B Co. actively 
exchanged assets, with A Co. sometimes owing B Co. up to $50 in net 
payments and B Co. sometimes owing A Co. up to $50 in net payments.  
Suppose that, other than a justified belief in this range, no reliable 
information allows the level of inter-company receivables to be set as of the 
bankruptcy filing date.  A substantive consolidation still works a significant 
disadvantage for Big Bank even if we use the range of net inter-company 
payables least favorable to B Co. (i.e. B Co. owing A Co. $50 net).  Indeed, 
this type of situation may reflect the true facts in Owens Corning.  In such a 
case, we are confident that substantive consolidation results in a wealth 
transfer from Big Bank to Local Bank even though we are unable to place a 
precise dollar figure on the amount of the wealth transfer.96
If no basis exists to set an upper or lower bound on the net inter-
company payables and receivables, then substantive consolidation is proper 
on grounds of necessity.  However, in many cases, the court will be able to 
estimate ranges.97  What should a court do if the only determinable facts 
or some other standard in excess of that typically required for proof in a civil matter.  I do 
mean that, in some cases, there simply will not be any evidence (or, at least, evidence 
appropriate for civil proof), to decide the allocation question.
95
 Some courts have attempted to deal with the degree of accounting inaccuracy that will be 
tolerated.  See R 2 Invs., LDC v. World Access, Inc. (In re World Access, Inc.), 301 B.R. 217 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003).
96
 The Third Circuit perceived this to be the situation in Owens Corning.  See 419 F.3d 195, 
215 n. 26 (3d Cir. 2005).
97
 At least the parties may think they can set ranges.  Some research suggests that bankruptcy 
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allow the setting of an upper and a lower bound but not fixing any details in 
between?  Again, the existing case law provides little guidance to answer 
this type of question.98
Courts also employ necessity rhetoric to justify imposition of 
substantive consolidation when no literal impossibility exists.  This second 
use of “necessity” reflects a judicial determination that the accounting and 
related costs of preparing separate financial records for individual 
companies is so significant that it jeopardizes a meaningful return to 
creditors.  In these cases, substantive consolidation preserves a return to 
creditors by reducing the accounting costs—consolidation is “necessary” to 
maximize each creditor’s recovery.  Courts often supplement necessity 
rhetoric by finding that a substantive consolidation “benefits all creditors.” 
These second type of cases form the “Pareto Scenario.”
B. THE PARETO SCENARIO
I borrow the label “Pareto” from welfare economics.  However, I intend 
my use as simply descriptive of a particular class of financial circumstances.  
Substantive consolidation may distribute the savings achieved by dispensing 
with procedures to separately account for each member in a consolidated 
group in a manner that improves each creditor’s position.  The situation 
feels like the familiar Pareto improvement from economics.  A substantive 
consolidation fits my Pareto Scenario if no creditor’s expected recovery is 
reduced and at least one creditor’s expected recovery is increased by the 
consolidation.  Return to our base example, but now with the introduction of 
a column to illustrate the impact of transaction costs.
Entities Values Costs Big Bank Factor Co. Local Bank
A $750 ($250) $1000/500 -0- -0- 
B $500 ($250) -0- $1000/250 -0- 
C $250 ($250) -0- -0- $1000/-0- 
Consol. $1500 N/A $1000/500 $1000/500 $1000/500
Introducing transaction costs, Big Bank would receive $500 in either 
the consolidation or in the separately administered case (and is indifferent).  
Factor Co. would receive $500 in the consolidation but only $250 in the 
separately administered case and Local Bank would receive $500 in the 
consolidation and $0 in the separately administered case.  Thus, when the 
participants may not be particularly good at making these kinds of judgments.  See LoPucki, 
infra note 107.
98
 My recommendation in such cases is that courts impose a partial substantive consolidation, 
but I am not aware of any court that has taken this step.  The settlement in Enron provides an 
example of a partial substantive consolidation in a negotiated settlement context, though the 
compromise resulted from an assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
substantive consolidation claims, rather than limits on the ability to conduct fact finding.
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transaction costs99 incurred to create separate balance sheets are factored 
into the analysis, a substantive consolidation yields a preferred result for 
two creditors and a neutral result for one creditor.  In the real world, 
however, neither the parties nor the court have any assurance that a 
substantive consolidation will yield such a value enhancing result because 
the transaction costs to be incurred must be incurred in order to perform the 
very calculation at issue.  Only with hindsight, after incurring the 
transaction costs, might we determine whether a substantive consolidation 
actually put more money in the creditors’ pockets than separately 
administered estates.
Despite this chicken and egg problem caused by lack of knowledge, 
parties and courts might make educated guesses about the relative costs and 
benefits of imposing substantive consolidation.  In cases in which all parties 
make the same assessment, a substantive consolidation might be agreed 
upon as part of a reorganization plan and no controversy will result.100  A 
controversy will arise in two cases.  First, different parties might make 
honest, but different, estimates concerning the relative costs and benefits of 
a substantive consolidation compared to the costs and benefits of separately 
administered estates.  Second, one or more parties might elect to engage in 
strategic behavior.  For example, Big Bank might object to a substantive 
consolidation hoping to extract some value from Local Bank because, in the 
absence of the consolidation, the parties expect Local Bank to receive little 
or nothing and estimate that Big Bank will receive a substantially equivalent 
recovery.  Big Bank might “sell” its consent to the substantive consolidation 
by initially objecting to a proposed consolidation.  For an enhanced 
recovery percentage, Big Bank might later drop its objection to a plan that 
included substantive consolidation.  The enhanced recovery to Big Bank 
would be justified as part of a settlement of litigation over substantive 
consolidation.
Hold out behavior might arise based solely on facts and circumstances 
related to that case.  But it also may be the product of a differing perspective 
between a court and creditors.  In theory, the court administers a bankruptcy 
case in the best interests of the particular group of creditors in the case 
before it.  Individual creditors, however, may have rational incentives 
outside the particular case to take positions that do not maximize returns 
99
 I use the costs associated with preparing balance sheets as an example.  In fact, these costs 
are merely one type that might be saved.  Cost savings include reduced litigation costs over 
fraudulent transfers, the benefits of emerging from bankruptcy sooner, and the simplification 
in, and reduction in number of, plans of reorganization that must be prepared and distributed 
to creditors for votes.
100
 Nevertheless, case law tells us that a court must make a separate and independent finding 
that substantive consolidation is justified.  See supra text accompanying note 28.
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within the case.101  Beyond possible different vantage points between judge 
and creditor, the possibility of court action further allows a judicial override 
if the personalities and testosterone levels in a particular case come to 
overshadow the exercise of sound judgment—a not uncommon 
phenomenon in my observation of workouts.
However rationalized, courts routinely approve substantive 
consolidation under the rubric of “benefiting all creditors”—a justification 
grounded in the promotion of efficiency.  The promotion of efficiency has a 
firm grounding in the history of the Bankruptcy Code and its 
predecessors.102  I turn now to another scenario in which appeals to 
efficiency might justify imposition of substantive consolidation but one 
which courts have not explicitly adopted.
C. THE KALDOR-HICKS SCENARIO
If a court embraced the “Kaldor-Hicks Improvement Scenario” as 
justifying substantive consolidation, the court would use the remedy when: 
(i) those creditors benefiting from the consolidation could afford to pay 
those creditors harmed by the consolidation and still be better off financially 
and (ii) those creditors harmed by the consolidation could not afford to bribe 
those benefiting from the consolidation to forgo the consolidation.  Though 
I again borrow a label from welfare economics, my use of “Kaldor-Hicks” 
is intended simply as descriptive of financial circumstances affecting a 
clearly identified group of creditors.  An arithmetic example illustrates the 
point by simply changing the relative transaction costs needed to separately 
account for each entity.
Entities Values Costs Big Bank Factor Co. Local Bank
A $750 ($150) $1000/600 -0- -0- 
B $500 ($350) -0- $1000/150 -0- 
C $250 ($250) -0- -0- $1000/-0- 
Consol. $1500 N/A $1000/500 $1000/500 $1000/500
Administration through a substantive consolidation would hurt Big 
Bank (by lowering its recovery from $600 to $500), though it would help 
both Factor Co. (by increasing its recovery from $150 to $500) and Local 
Bank (by increasing its recovery from $0 to $500).  Though this simple 
consolidation would not satisfy the narrow Pareto improvement criteria 
because Big Bank is hurt by the consolidation, substantive consolidation 
101
 This situation might exist for creditors who participate in numerous bankruptcy cases.  
Positions taken in one case may influence results in other cases.  In effect, any particular 
bankruptcy case functions as merely one stage in a multi-stage, multi-player game for these 
creditors.  For example, a bank might take a tough position in one case, even at the expense of 
its recovery in that case, hoping its reputation for tough negotiating will provide advantage in 
another case.
102 See supra note 61.
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yields enough cost savings such that Factor Co. and Local Bank could pay 
Big Bank to accept the consolidation and, following the payment, all parties 
would be better off financially.  Such a simple renegotiation would find 
Factor Co. and Local Bank agreeing to pay Big Bank an aggregate of $101 
or more to consent to the substantive consolidation.
Unlike the Necessity Scenario and the Pareto Scenario in which case 
law rhetoric matches the scenario, I do not find reported cases which 
embrace the rhetoric of Kaldor-Hicks improvement to justify imposition of 
substantive consolidation.  Outside the case law, however, I find a large 
number of negotiated reorganizations in which substantive consolidation is 
imposed as part of implementing a plan or in which settlement of threatened 
substantive consolidation litigation is used as the rationale to adjust claim 
amounts and/or percentage recoveries.  The large number of consensual 
substantive consolidation reorganization plans suggests to me that, in some 
cases, courts approve substantive consolidation in Kaldor-Hicks Scenarios 
that are not also Pareto improvements.103  I suspect parties often negotiate 
reorganization plans to share cost savings to improve the positions of all 
parties even though mere imposition of substantive consolidation, absent the 
negotiation, would not have improved everyone’s position.  If this 
supposition is correct, the possibility of a Kaldor-Hicks improvement 
functions as a silent efficiency rationale for imposition of substantive 
consolidation or use of the doctrine by a court in justifying approval of a 
reorganization plan or a settlement.  The important point is this:  courts do 
not expressly mention Kaldor-Hicks improvement as a rationale because 
they wait until the parties themselves have converted a Kaldor-Hicks 
Scenario into a Pareto Scenario through negotiations.
Another possibility exists, given that the parties are functioning under 
the umbrella of uncertainty.  Creditors who believe (i) they are operating in 
a Kaldor-Hicks Scenario and (ii) would be harmed by use of substantive 
consolidation (such as Big Bank in the example) simply may fear that, 
despite their beliefs, the facts would allow a court to support a finding of a 
Necessity Scenario or a Pareto Scenario and that this finding would not 
constitute reversible error, even if erroneous.  In such a case, the threat of 
substantive consolidation hangs over the negotiation of the reorganization 
plan, leading creditors to agree to settle claim amounts and distribution 
percentages at levels they believe fairly allocate savings associated with use 
of substantive consolidation in a Kaldor-Hicks Scenario.  For example, Big 
Bank may accept an aggregate payment of $75 to approve a consolidation 
103
 To think otherwise, one would have to assume that all these consensual substantive 
consolidation plans either are cases of strict necessity or cases of a Pareto improvement.  This 
is a restrictive assumption that seems unlikely to me and, therefore, one that I do not make.
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for fear that, even though on the true facts Big Bank should receive $101 or 
more, the risk exists that the court will order consolidation and Big Bank 
will receive only $500, rather than the $600 it believes it is entitled to
outside of consolidation.
As with the Pareto Scenario, creditors have incentives to agree to  a 
substantive consolidation reorganization plan in a Kaldor-Hick Scenario
because negotiations allow each creditor to improve its position.  Again, one 
might question the need for the remedy to apply in this scenario because the 
parties should agree to the efficient outcome without court intervention.  
Again, the motive of limiting strategic behavior applies in the Kaldor-Hicks 
Scenario as in the Pareto Scenario.
Through the threat of substantive consolidation, the court can influence 
the parties to produce an efficient result even if they would fail to reach that 
result in the absence of the threat.  Why doesn’t case law rhetoric embrace 
forced imposition of substantive consolidation in the Kaldor-Hicks 
Scenario?  Perhaps courts fear that the precedent of causing certain creditors 
economic harm to create economic gain for other creditors cannot be 
contained.  Once harm to a particular creditor is allowed because it 
enhances overall creditor recoveries, the rationale may expand beyond the 
narrow situation in which we might criticize the harmed creditor for failure 
to reach a bargain sharing benefits that flow from consolidation.  The same 
problem does not apply to a reorganization plan negotiated in a Kaldor-
Hicks Scenario, because the negotiation produces a Pareto-like result. A
consolidation imposed by the court in a Kaldor-Hicks Scenario, without 
negotiation, produces a wealth transfer as a penalty for failure to agree.  Yet
there is no assurance that the penalty will fall on those who might be said to 
have unreasonably failed to reach agreement.  Rather than imposing a 
random penalty for negotiation failure, the court approves a plan in a 
Kaldor-Hicks Scenario only after the negotiation results in reallocations 
benefiting all creditors.
Even though imposing substantive consolidation might produce cost 
savings that boost the total payments to creditors, we would not criticize a 
creditor for opposing consolidation if the harm to the creditor exceeded any 
possible compensating payment from other creditors.  In such a case, the 
substantive consolidation creates a wealth transfer—my fourth scenario.
D. THE WEALTH TRANSFER SCENARIO
In a Wealth Transfer Scenario, the aggregate amount of losses suffered 
as a result of substantive consolidation by creditors harmed in the 
consolidation exceeds the aggregate amount of transaction cost savings 
realized by imposing substantive consolidation.  The losses suffered by the 
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disadvantaged creditors show up as gains for the creditors who benefit from 
the consolidation.  Because the substantive consolidation saves transaction 
costs, the aggregate payout to creditors with consolidation exceeds the 
aggregate payout to creditors without consolidation (even though some 
individual creditors are worse off).  As seen in the Necessity Scenario, some 
cases of necessity may result in wealth transfers.  This will be the case when 
the magnitude of accounting questions that are not determinable (e.g. does 
Company B own a $50 receivable or owe a $50 payable?) is small in 
relation to the estimated wealth transfer effected by the substantive 
consolidation (e.g. the expected $500 loss suffered by Big Bank as a result 
of consolidation).
The Third Circuit clearly identified the Owens Corning case as a 
Wealth Transfer Scenario, while the district judge found substantive 
consolidation “necessary” to effect the reorganization.  Both courts might be 
correct.  We have seen how a case of necessity can overlap with a case of 
pure wealth transfer.  Existing articulation of substantive consolidation 
doctrine did not allow the district judge the option of imposing partial 
substantive consolidation to save costs without creating a wealth transfer.104
The Third Circuit decision might be seen to foreclose a substantive 
consolidation that results in a pure wealth transfer (particularly a significant 
wealth transfer).  The better view is that the Third Circuit decision simply 
rejects the district judge’s finding of necessity.  The latter reading is 
strongly preferred because, in the face of a wealth transfer, the court went 
on to consider whether substantive consolidation conflicted with the lending 
syndicate’s reliance interest.
E. REFORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE
In summary, case law justifies imposition of substantive consolidation 
on economic grounds in the Necessity Scenario and the Pareto Scenario.  
Additionally, courts may justify approval of substantive consolidation in the 
Kaldor-Hicks Scenario when the parties have conducted their own 
negotiations as reflected in a plan of reorganization or a settlement so that, 
104
 The Third Circuit identified the possibility of a partial consolidation as an open question in 
Owens Corning.  See 419 F.3d 195, 210 n.16 (3d Cir. 2005).  Case law supports a partial 
approach in similar contexts.  Cf. Talcott v. Wharton (In re Continental Vending Machine 
Corp.), 517 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 913 (1976) (noting that a court may 
qualify substantive consolidation to protect unsecured creditors, while not consolidating 
secured claims); In re Pittsburght Rys. Co., 155 F.2d 477 (3 Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 
731 (1946) (noting that a court may order consolidation with respect to unsecured claims and 
leave cases unconsolidated with respect to secured claims).  In my mind, a partial 
consolidation would involve a court imposed accommodation, similar to the negotiated 
settlement in Enron, in which a portion of the estate is distributed as if consolidation had been 
ordered, with the balance being distributed on a separate entity basis.
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by the time the plan or settlement is approved, benefits flow to all creditors.  
The approval of the plan then rises or falls with the voting procedures of 
Chapter 11.  In no case, however, does the rationale support imposition of 
substantive consolidation on economic grounds alone when the 
consolidation creates a pure wealth transfer.  On this reformulation, case 
law to the contrary should be rejected.105  A court might use dicta in a 
variety of cases to support crafting a “partial” consolidation to break an 
impasse between creditors when a case of “minor” necessity arises.  
However, such a step would be an innovation (though one that I would 
endorse).106
The valuation/timing problem for application of substantive 
consolidation doctrine is analogous to the valuation/timing problem with 
identifying the “residual owner” of a bankruptcy estate.  Professor LoPucki 
succinctly states the problem with identifying the residual owner:
To identify the residual owner presumably would require valuation of the firm.  
That valuation would have to occur at the outset of the bankruptcy 
reorganization case.  Yet, valuation is notoriously expensive and difficult.  
Indeed, valuation is the essence of the bankruptcy reorganization process.  If 
the court could value the firm at the outset of the proceeding, the proceeding 
would no longer be necessary.107
Similar to the problem of identifying a “residual owner,” a court often 
will not be sure that its imposition of substantive consolidation will benefit 
all creditors.  In some cases, for a court confidently to make this finding, the 
parties would need to have already spent the time, effort and expense to 
prepare separate balance sheets.  Yet, avoiding this expenditure provides the 
very benefit that imposition of substantive consolidation is expected to 
produce.  The circular process of determining the facts needed to justify 
application of the rule destroys the benefit achieved by application of the 
rule.  At a minimum, a significant tension exists between the need to find 
facts and the anticipated benefits.  The more fact finding required, the less 
savings that creditors might realize. Uncertainty is present in all scenarios.  
There is, however, no uncertainty in the application of the rule.  The rule of 
decision is not open textured, though the application of the doctrine is 
uncertain for epistemological reasons. Use of a laundry list of factors 
detailing a failure to observe corporate formalities relating to a breakdown 
105An example of rhetoric to be ignored is the balancing test in AutoTrain.  See supra text 
accompanying note 74.
106 See supra note 104.
107
 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Myth of the Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, 82 WASH. U. L. 
Q 1341, 1345-46 (2004).
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in the internal asset identification function of the consolidated group serves 
as a heuristic device to justify the finding of cost savings that benefit all 
creditors.
One might rationally decide that proper analysis of substantive 
consolidation should begin and end with the economic account given above.  
The rhetoric of case law, however, reveals a separate and distinct 
justification for substantive consolidation grounded in the rationale 
originally evolved for corporate law “veil piercing.”  Lawyers doing
securitization transactions recognize this dual strand of justification for 
substantive consolidation.  Veil piercing cases still merit mention in 
substantive consolidation legal opinions rendered in structured financings 
today, attesting to its continued vitality.
V. THE VEIL PIERCING RATIONALE
In contrast to substantive consolidation grounded in economics, where 
the stated rule is clear but the facts are uncertain, the rule justifying 
substantive consolidation on veil piercing grounds is open textured, though 
the facts often are not disputed.  Nevertheless, the law provides a list of
factors without suggesting the particular weights assigned to those factors or 
how those factors might combine to produce an outcome.  The judicial 
discretion to assign different weights to particular factors (or combinations 
of factors) contributes to the open texture of the doctrine and to 
indeterminacy of outcome.108 Factors such as common directors, officers 
and shared bank accounts present little room for factual disagreement.  The 
argument revolves around the legal effect given to such facts.109  The 
problems facing substantive consolidation justified on veil piercing grounds 
mirrors the problems facing substantive consolidation justified on economic 
efficiency grounds.
Reflection on the cases, however, produces the following principle.  A 
court may order substantive consolidation to correct a “wrong” if, in so 
doing, the court does not commit a “wrong.”  For this purpose, it is to be 
understood that producing a simple wealth transfer does not constitute a 
“wrong.”  The classic wrong committed by a company in a substantive 
consolidation case is some form of misrepresentation in which the company 
misleads a class of creditors into thinking that more assets support their 
108 See generally John Zeleznikow, The Split-Up Project: Induction, Context and Knowledge, 
3 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 147 (2004) (describing various sources of open texture in law).
109 See, e.g., Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940) (listing factors to consider 
because “[t]he determination as to whether a subsidiary is an instrumentality is primarily a 
question of fact and degree”).
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loans than in fact exist.110 (This is true whether the deficiency existed at the 
time of the loan or if it resulted from subsequent transfers.)  This explains 
why, in many early cases, courts employ the substantive consolidation 
remedy in circumstances that also support use of fraudulent conveyance law 
to protect creditors.  In these latter cases, the debtor typically has transferred 
assets to a related company to prevent payment to a creditor.  Breach of a 
covenant also might constitute a “wrong” correctable by substantive 
consolidation.111  I am not suggesting that a court is limited to correcting 
only actionable “wrongs” such as fraud.
The various factors listed to support the veil piercing rationale for 
substantive consolidation should not be examined for the simple purpose of 
generating an identity among the various companies.  Instead, the court 
should consider these factors as part of its determination of whether a wrong 
was committed, such as misleading a creditor.  One can easily see how, in 
some cases, a combination of the veil piercing factors might produce a 
creditor misperception.  The misperception might be caused either from a 
breakdown in the internal asset identification function of the consolidated 
group or from a breakdown in the artificial personality of the consolidated 
group members.  However, in the absence of such a misperception or other 
wrong, we should not worry about silly things such as whether a special 
purpose company has a separate phone and letterhead.  Substantive 
consolidation does not exist simply as a remedy to promote good corporate 
housekeeping.
My approach to this branch of substantive consolidation doctrine 
resembles the approach to veil piercing taken by the National Labor 
Relations Board when deciding the extent of shareholder liability for 
employment claims.  In White Oak Coal,112 the Board stated:
We conclude that the corporate veil may be pierced when: (1) the shareholder 
and corporation have failed to maintain separate identities, and (2) adherence 
to the corporate structure would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or lead to 
an evasion of legal obligations.
110 Accord Posner supra note 48.
111
 It is common for a syndicated loan agreement to provide that the borrower must cause any 
new subsidiary formed by it to execute a guarantee of the loan.  If the borrower forms 
subsidiary companies but does not cause the guarantees to be executed, then the syndicate will 
be structurally subordinated to credit incurred by the new subsidiaries.  The existence of a 
default for failure to procure the guarantees does not change this result.  In such a case, a 
substantive consolidation of the new subsidiaries with the borrower would correct the harm 
caused by the breach, benefiting, rather than harming, the loan syndicate.
112
 318 NLRB 732 (1995).
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For the Board, mere failure to observe corporate formalities did not 
suffice for veil piercing.  Disrespecting the corporate form must create, in 
some sense, a “wrong” which veil piercing corrects.  This view conforms to 
that expressed by federal courts when using veil piercing to further some 
federal policy.113  What I am advocating is that the veil piercing rationale 
for substantive consolidation remember its roots, and require a prior finding 
of a harm to correct.114
The analytical problems with the rationale for veil piercing were 
discussed in the 1920’s115 and apply with equal force when used as a 
rationale for substantive consolidation.  At a surface level, veil piercing is 
justified by a litany of metaphors:116  a subsidiary is found to be the “alter 
ego” or “mere instrumentality” of the parent company, suggesting an 
identity of the subsidiary with the parent; this identity justifies a decision to 
ignore the asset partition created by the corporate business form.  Though
the litany of factors requires resort to metaphor for their use, many courts 
appear unmoved by the mere presence or absence of these factors.  Rather, 
courts use the factors to justify substantive consolidation when imposition 
of substantive consolidation avoids a perceived inequitable result; similarly, 
courts deny substantive consolidation when the perceived result is 
inequitable.  The prerequisite that there exist a “wrong” to correct lends 
structure to the examination of factors borrowed from veil piercing to justify 
substantive consolidation.  Further structure comes from the notion that 
abuse of the corporate form must have contributed to the wrong.
113 See Bd. of Trs. of Mill Cabinet Pension Trust Fund for N. Cal. v. Valley Cabinet & Mfg. 
Co., 877 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing veil piercing to recover pension contributions 
made pursuant to ERISA); Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Eng’g, 605 F.2d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 
1979); accord U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998); Bangor Punta Operations v. Bangor & 
Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 713 (1974) (disregarding corporate form where form was 
used “to defeat an overriding public policy. . . . ”); Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944) 
(finding good faith and adequate capitalization not necessary to pierce the corporate veil when 
pursuing federal policy required liability).
114
 This suggestion might seem to go against many courts’ perception of substantive 
consolidation as distinct from state law veil piercing.  See, e.g., In re Stone & Webster, Inc. 
286 B.R. at 538-39.  I too believe there is a difference.  However, I base the difference in the 
fact that three separate grounds exist for substantive consolidation.  Only when using the veil 
piercing rationale do I require a finding of prior harm.
115
 William O. Douglas & Carol M. Shanks, Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary 
Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193 (1929); see also Henry W. Ballantine, Separate Entity of 
Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CAL. L. REV. 12, 18-20 (1926) (considering notions 
of agency and alter ego, and metaphors of alias and dummy, to describe the relationship 
between parent and subsidiary).
116
 Judge Cardozo aptly described veil piercing doctrines as “enveloped in the mists of 
metaphor.”  Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926), reh’g denied, 155 
N.E. 914 (1927).
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My suggested approach to substantive consolidation is consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s view that veil piercing doctrine “is not, properly 
speaking, a rule, but a convenient way of designating the application . . . of 
the broader equitable principle that the doctrine of corporate entity . . . will 
not be regarded when to do so would work fraud or injustice.”117  The core 
inquiry in this branch of substantive consolidation must be to find a 
“wrong” to correct, rather than merely to find a substantial identity between 
companies.  The alter ego factors help explain why or how the “wrong” was 
committed, but do not serve as an independent reason to impose substantive 
consolidation.  This approach coheres with my approach to the economic 
rationale in which misuse of the corporate form explains the break down in 
the asset identification function but does not independently justify use of 
substantive consolidation.
On this reformulation, the Owens Corning notion that a proponent of 
substantive consolidation must show actual reliance on an identity among 
the entities to be consolidated is too strong.  Indeed, if taken seriously, this 
requirement could operate in practice to prohibit many applications of 
substantive consolidation that my analysis suggests otherwise would be 
proper.  A creditor may be misled into believing that assets support a loan 
made to a subsidiary without believing that it made a loan to the parent 
company.  The creditor need only think that parent company assets support 
the loan.  For this, we do not require a fraudulent transfer.  The assets may 
have been parent company assets all along, with the creditor simply being 
misled by a breakdown in separate corporate personality or asset 
identification leading to the confusion.  This can happen even though the 
creditor is well aware that the subsidiary is a member of a consolidated 
group made up of different legal entities.  In Owens Corning, the 
noteholders may have thought that value in subsidiary companies reflected 
on a consolidated balance sheet would be available to repay their notes 
because they were unaware of the significant structural subordination
caused by the lending syndicates’ guarantees.  This belief does not require 
that the Noteholders also believed that Owens Corning had no subsidiaries.
Under my reformulation, the Third Circuit first should have found a 
“wrong” to correct—ideally either a misrepresentation or a covenant breach 
relating to consolidated group structure.  Then it should have proceeded to 
consider whether use of the remedy created a further “wrong” (which would 
have rendered use of the doctrine improper).  A misrepresentation wrong 
might well have existed in the Owens Corning case.  Owens Corning sold 
unsecured notes using an offering memorandum that did not disclose the 
risk that the note investors would be subject to structural subordination to 
117
 Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939).
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creditors of subsidiaries, such as the lending syndicate.118  An offering 
memorandum typically discloses the risk of structural subordination when 
the corporate structure presents that risk.119
Notwithstanding this omission, the case for misrepresentation does not 
automatically follow.  Owens Corning, the parent company, was not a mere 
shell entity with assets consisting solely of subsidiary stock.  Rather, its 
other assets might have sufficed at one time to repay note investors 
notwithstanding structural subordination.  Fact finding would decide 
whether failure to mention the risk of structural subordination amounted to a 
material omission, justifying use of substantive consolidation.
Assume that the disclosure failure amounted to a material omission.  
Only then would the court turn to the question of whether use of substantive 
consolidation creates a second wrong by harming a legitimate reliance 
interest of the syndicated lenders.  As discussed above, however, the Third 
Circuit likely erred when it made its finding of creditor reliance.120
My reformulation of the existing economic and veil piercing rationales 
for substantive consolidation do not exhaust my view of the proper reach of 
the doctrine.  Though I believe it would be appropriate for a court to use the 
fairness rationale advanced below, such a use would launch the doctrine 
into uncharted territory as far as direct case law support is concerned.
VI.  THE FAIRNESS RATIONALE
Commentators often identify the promotion of equity between a debtor 
and its creditors as a significant goal of bankruptcy law.121  What may get 
lost in a general account of bankruptcy’s goals is the related objective of 
promoting equity among various creditors.  When the goal of promoting 
equity among creditors is discussed, conversation tends to focus on 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code such as the automatic stay,122 which 
prevents a race among creditors to the courthouse, the recovery of 
118
 The Third Circuit alludes to this disclosure failure when it suggests that those pursuing 
substantive consolidation should separately pursue securities fraud claims. In re Owens 
Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 212 n.22, 215 n. 27 (3d Cir. 2005).
119 See In re Worldcom, Inc., 2003 WL 21498904 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that before 
bankruptcy “WorldCom issued more than $27 billion of debt. In the prospectus distributed by 
WorldCom, it informed buyers that their debt would be ‘structurally subordinate’ to the debt 
owed to creditors of subsidiaries, such as Wireless.”)
120 See supra Part III. Dueling Standards for Substantive Consolidation, C. An Example of 
Misplaced Reliance.
121 SKEEL, supra note 61, at 45.
122
 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Code year).
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preferential payments,123 which defeats a debtor’s attempt to prefer payment 
of one creditor over another, the recovery of fraudulent conveyances,124 and 
the absolute priority rule, which prevents payments to lower ranking 
creditors or interest holders if higher ranking creditors have not been paid in 
full.125  Another, less noticed, principle of equity among creditors lurks in 
the background; it is based upon consideration of the sources of payment 
available to various creditors to satisfy their claims.  Some of these 
provisions are reflected in express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 
whereas others exist indirectly as equitable principles developed originally 
in England and incorporated into current law, arguably by § 105 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.126
At a most general level, we have a simple question of fairness when one 
creditor (a “multiple source creditor”) has resort to two or more sources of 
payment (at least (i) a “shared source” and (ii) one additional “alternate 
source” which is not shared) and another creditor (a “single source 
creditor”) has resort to a single shared source of payment also available to 
the multiple source creditor.  Should the law direct how the multiple source 
creditor goes about satisfying his claims or should the multiple source 
creditor remain free to pursue remedies as he sees fit in accord with the 
contracts he has negotiated?  The question arises in cases of balance sheet 
insolvency of the shared source.  The problem increases in complexity when 
the alternate source also is balance sheet insolvent.  In the absence of 
scarcity, the question of fair allocation does not arise.127
The law provides a partial answer to the allocation question in various 
123 Id. § 547(Code year).
124 Id. § 548 (Code year).  State fraudulent conveyance law also may be employed using § 544 
of the Bankruptcy Code.
125
 The absolute priority rule derives from Supreme Court precedent.  See N. Pac. v. Boyd, 
228 U.S. 482 (1913).  William Douglas used this case to support the Bankruptcy Act’s first 
version of the absolute priority rule.  See SKEEL, supra note 61 at 67.  The current version of 
the absolute priority rule appears in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).  Prior to Nothern Pacific, 
railroad reorganizers often squeezed out unsecured creditors by allowing mortgage 
bondholders and exisiting equity security holders to participate in the reorganized company.  
Unsecured creditors complained that it was unfair to allow participation by equity security 
holders while they, as more senior members of the capital structure, had been excluded from 
participation.
126
 The actual grounds for use of equitable principles by a federal court exercising bankruptcy 
jurisdiction are discussed hereinafter in Part VII. Constitutional Concerns Over Equity 
Principles.
127
 “[T]he circumstances of justice obtain whenever mutually disinterested persons put 
forward conflicting claims to the division of social advantages under conditions of moderate
scarcity.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 128 (1971).
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related doctrines collected under the general heading of “marshalling.”128
Again, at a most general level, the law says fairness requires that the 
multiple source creditor first seek payment from the alternate source rather 
than deplete the shared source of payment.  Using up the shared source may 
harm the single source creditor without benefitting the multiple source 
creditor.  In some sense, a multiple source creditor who first pursues a 
shared source for payment gratutiously harms the single source creditor.  
Equity may intervene to stop this result.129  The principle of fairness that 
emerges from this general fact pattern is sometimes identified as the 
solution to the “two funds” problem.
In the above, I deliberately have been vague about the nature of the 
sources of payment.  Sources of payment might be various items of 
collateral security pledged to creditors by a single debtor (with each 
payment source being an asset or pool of assets subject to a separate lien).  
The classic multiple asset fact pattern involves a debtor, D, who grants a 
first mortgage on Blackacre to A and also grants a first mortgage on 
Greenacre to A.  Later, D grants a second mortgage on Greenacre to B.  
Consider this circumstance to be a classic “multiple asset scenario.”130  The 
payment sources are individuated in a multiple asset scenario by a 
combination of asset identification through description, coupled with 
imposition of liens on the assets identified.  The junior creditor invokes the 
doctrine of marshalling to compel the senior creditor to satisfy its claim first 
from Blackacre, the alternate payment source.131
128
 As a general matter, a court of equity does not consider the question of marshalling of 
assets unless both sources of payment are under the jurisdiction and control of the court.  See
Lewis v. U.S., 92 U.S. 618, 623 (1875).  In procedurally consolidated bankruptcies, all the 
debtors, and all the assets subject to consolidation, are under the jurisdiction of a single court.  
This would not be the case, however, if consolidation of a debtor with a non-debtor were 
sought.
129
 Though equity might direct the senior creditor to exhaust a separate fund prior to accessing 
a shared fund, this directive typically would not be made if it resulted in harm to the senior 
creditor.  See JOSEPH STORY, EQ. JUR. § 633 (13th ed.)
130
 In a variation on the multiple asset scenario, D later grants a second mortgage on Blackacre 
to C.  With two junior interests to consider, the law must tell A which mortgage to foreclose 
first.  Under the “inverse alienation doctrine,” A is told to foreclose on Blackacre.  The theory 
seems to be that, all the mortgages being public, B might have known that only A had a claim 
to Blackacre and taken comfort from the fact its junior position in Greenacre was, in some 
sense, less at risk because of the additional security for A’s claim.  C can not take such 
comfort were C to have examined the record.  C would have known that, on the facts available 
to B at the time of the second mortgage, A would have been required to look to Blackacre 
first.  Thus, D’s alienation in the form of the second mortgage on Blackacre to C is least 
preferred.  Properties are selected for foreclosure in the inverse order of alienation when 
multiple junior interests might be protected in support of the two funds doctrine, which is seen 
as the primary purpose of marshalling.
131
 In some jurisdictions, marshalling has developed so that the senior creditor A may proceed 
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Sources of payment might consist of distinct legal persons who are 
jointly and severally liable on a debt.  The classic multiple legal person fact 
pattern involves a general partnership and its individual general partners.  If 
A is a creditor of the general partnership D (formed by partners P and Q), A 
also is a creditor of the general partners P and Q, and, thus, is a multiple 
source creditor.  Multiple source creditor status results because, by 
operation of law, general partners are liable for their partnership’s debts.  
Another creditor, B, may be a single source creditor with a claim solely 
against P because B has no claim against the general partnership D or other 
partner, Q.  Consider this circumstance to be a classic “multiple entity 
scenario.”  The payment sources in a multiple entitiy scenario are 
individuated by the boundaries of the legal entities involved, coupled with 
rules and procedures that identify assets as owned by the legal entitites.  The 
assets identified as owned by the legal entities comprise the real payment 
sources, though these assets are described indirectly by reference to a legal 
entity.  In both these scenarios we might think of A as the senior creditor 
and B as the junior creditor.
A significant structural difference exists between the multiple asset and 
the multiple entity scenarios; the difference relates to the priority of claims.  
In the classic multiple asset scenario the senior creditor holds a senior claim 
both on the assets in the alternate payment source and on the assets in the 
shared payment source.  In the classic multiple entity scenario, the senior 
creditor holds a senior claim on the alternate payment source (by virtue of 
structural seniority to investors and their creditors) but holds a claim ranked 
pari passu with the junior creditor on the assets in the shared payment 
source.  The competition among pari passu claims for entitlement to the 
shared payment source raises the problem known as “double proof.”
Double proof presents two related fairness questions for consideration. 
The first considers the priority of the senior creditor’s claim against the 
same source.  The second relates to the size of the claim that the senior 
creditor is permitted to make against the shared payment source.
In the case of partnership insolvencies, the law sometimes answered 
that the senior creditor’s claim against the shared payment source should be 
subordinated to the claims of the junior creditor against the shared payment 
source.
132
  This result makes the second fairness question moot.  In 
against Greenacre even though it is the shared payment source.  The junior creditor B invokes 
the doctrine of marshalling to obtain subrogation to A’s mortgage on Blackacre.  Professor 
Langdell reminds us that the marshalling doctrine can be invoked to harm unsecured creditors 
and that, in such a situation, he finds use of the doctrine works the opposite of equity.  See C. 
C. Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 HARV. L. REV. 69-70 (1887).
132
 This rule of subordination is part of the so-called “jingle rule” pursuant to which 
partnership creditors proved claims first against partnership assets and creditors of single 
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circumstances in which partnership creditors’ claims against a partner are 
not subordinated, the question of the size of the claim allowed against the 
partner remains.  If not subordinated, the senior creditor could, in theory, 
make a full claim against the shared payment source—a form of double 
proof.  However, if the senior creditor had first satisfied a portion of its 
claim against the partnership assets before proceeding against the partner (as 
the “two funds” solution classically required), the possibility exists that the 
senior creditor be allowed only to prove the smaller, residual amount of its 
claim.  Current bankruptcy law relating to partnerships changed prior law 
and allows a claim to be made for the full amount against the individual 
partner’s estate once a deficiency in partnership assets is shown.  Though 
the Bankruptcy Code now allows this specific form of double proof in 
partnership insolvencies, it takes care to eliminate other forms of double 
proof in the partnership context—revealing a mixed and theoretically 
inconsistent approach.133
In contrast, Bankruptcy Code Section 506(a) directly addresses the 
problem of double proof when handling claims of partially secured 
creditors. The partially secured creditor is a multiple source creditor 
because he proves his claim against two sources: (i) the collateral or 
alternate source and (ii) the debtor’s general estate available to unsecured 
partners proved claims first against the assets of the individual partners.  Only after creditors 
had exhausted their respective sources of payment might claims be pursued against the other 
source, with partnership creditors taking the crumbs left by the creditors of the individual 
partner and creditors of the individual partner only accessing the value associated with the 
partner’s residual interest in the partnership.  Justice Holmes refers to this subordination rule 
in Mitchell v. Hampel, 276 U.S. 299 (1928).  See also Francis v. McNeal, 228 U.S. 695 (1913) 
(Justice Holmes recounting “the old rule as to the prior claim of partnership debts on 
partnership assets, and that of individual debts upon the individual estate”).  By the time of 
Mitchell v. Hampel, the Supreme Court clearly identified the subordination rule with Section 
5f of the old Bankruptcy Act of 1898, see Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239 (1920), without 
acknowledging its much older English origins.  See Craven v. Knight, 2 Chancery Rep. 226 
[21 E.R. 664] (1682), Ex parte Crowder, 2 Vern 706 [23 E.R. 1064] (1715), Ex parte Cooke, 
2 Peere Williams 500 [24 E.R. 834] (1728); Ex parte Elton, 3 Vesey Junior 238 [30 E.R. 988] 
(1796).  I rely on work by Dr. McNair and Dr. Getzler.  See infra note 172. On the facts of 
Mitchell v. Hampel, despite the subordination rule, a full double proof without subordination 
was allowed because the partnership creditor at issue had not relied simply on the liability of 
the partners under partnership law.  To supplement liability imposed by the partnership 
business form, the creditor required that partners execute separate guarantees to provide 
additional security.  The guaranty contract provided a separate basis for claims against the 
partners—claims not subject to subordination preventing double proof.  See also Myers v. Int. 
Trust. Co., 273 U.S. 380 (1927) (holding that a partnership composition agreement did not 
absolve partners of liability for endorsement of partnership notes).  The “jingle rule” has been 
replaced by § 723 of the Bankruptcy Code.  The Bankruptcy Code does not expressly repeal 
the jingle rule in Chapter 11 cases, accord Kennedy, Partnership and Partners' Estates Under 
the Bankruptcy Code,1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 219, 274, 277, though courts have so held.  See In re
Safren, 65 Bankr. 566 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
133 See Kennedy, supra, note 132.
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creditors (i.e. the “shared source”).  You might frame this problem as one of 
competing “secured” creditors claiming against the shared source because 
the bankruptcy trustee has the status of a hypothetical lien creditor. 134
However, in the case of these “secured” creditors, the multiple source 
creditor does not enjoy a priority claim against the shared asset source.  An 
example makes the situation clear.
Suppose that A holds a $100 claim against D that is secured by a lien on 
an asset worth $70.  Under current bankruptcy law,135 A holds two claims: a 
secured claim for $70 and an unsecured deficiency claim for $30.  Suppose 
that B holds an unsecured claim against D, for $100, and that D owns 
unencumbered assets worth $60.  The result is that A files a secured claim 
for $70 and an unsecured claim for $30; B files an unsecured claim for 
$100.  A receives a bankruptcy dividend of $70 from the collateral proceeds 
and $13.85 from the unencumbered assets; B receives a bankruptcy 
dividend of $46.15 out of the unencumbered assets.  If, however, A had 
been allowed to prove a full $100 unsecured claim, A would have been 
given $30 and B would have been given $30 out of the unencumbered 
assets.  If A were permitted to prove its entire claim against the shared asset 
source, A would squeeze down the recovery obtained by B.  The larger the 
numerator allowed to A, the more it reduces B’s recovery.  There is a 
double proof because $70 gets “proved” against two sources.  Even in cases 
in which double proof has been permitted, the senior creditor is not allowed 
a double recovery; the bankruptcy dividend is capped at $100.
Historically, the principle of fairness that limited the senior creditor to 
filing a proof for the unsecured deficiency, rather than the entire amount of 
the debt, was known as the “bankruptcy” rule.  The bankruptcy rule operates 
to prevent the squeeze down effect by preventing double proof.  The United 
States Supreme Court determined, in a 5-4 decision,136 that the bankruptcy 
rule derived from the express language of the former Bankruptcy Act137 and, 
thus, did not apply in a context to which that act did not apply.  In an 
insolvency proceeding for a national bank not subject to the former 
Bankruptcy Act, the Supreme Court applied the “chancery” rule and 
allowed the multiple source creditor to file a claim in the full amount of its 
134 See Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Center Wholesale, Inc. (In re Center Wholesale, 
Inc.), 759 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1985).  I do not believe that characterization of the problem as 
one of competing secured creditors has particular value except to the extent that it enables one 
to more closely tie the problem of double proof to the doctrine of marshalling collateral for 
secured claims.
135 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Code year).
136
 Merrill v. Nat. Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U.S. 131 (1899) (Fuller, C.J.).
137 Id. at 146-47.
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debt against the shared asset source.  In two strongly worded dissents, 
Justices White and Gray explained the historical origins of the bankruptcy 
rule, tracing it back to England, and further argued on statutory construction 
grounds why the bankrutpcy rule should not be limited to the application 
given it in the Bankruptcy Act.138
Properly understoood, the so-called “bankruptcy rule,” though not 
expressly identified with the doctrine of marshalling, addresses the same 
problem outlined generically at the start of this section: how do we fairly 
deal with circumstances in which the interests of a multiple source creditor
conflicts with the interests of a single source creditor?  In each of the three 
cases—marshalling collateral, marshalling partnership claims and allowing 
claims of undersecured creditors—the law has developed doctrines in which 
considerations of fairness override the results that would obtain if the parties 
were free to exercise the rights given them under contract.
In each case, the law recognizes that use of a particular accepted 
business technique can result in unfairness even though there is nothing 
wrong per se with use of the business technique.  In a context that creates 
unfairness, equitable considerations operate to modify the result that 
contract law produces by straightforward application of the business 
technique.  In each case, use of the business technique both produces asset 
partitioning and divides creditors between multiple source creditors and 
single source creditors.
Modern financial practice presents the same conflict between the 
interests of multiple source creditors and single source creditors.  The 
conflict arises with great frequency in syndicated lending.  Anytime a 
consolidated family of companies obtains a syndicated loan supported by 
intercompany guarantees the syndicated lenders become multiple source 
creditors.  These multiple source creditors compete with creditors of the 
individual group companies, typically single source creditors.  However, 
unlike the three cases discussed above, courts have failed expressly to 
articulate a modern doctrine of marshalling that might apply in the context 
of corporate groups using intercompany guarantees to obtain financing.139
138
 The historical connection between bankruptcy laws in the United States and England is 
strong.  The first United States bankruptcy law, enacted in 1800, derived almost entirely from 
English bankruptcy legislation.  See SKEEL, supra note 61, at 2.  The Supreme Court held 
early on that the United States Constitution’s use of the term “bankruptcy” referred generally 
to laws governing financial distress and did not make a distinction between “bankruptcy” and 
“insolvency” as existed in English legislation.  Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheaton 122 
(1819).
139
 Combining the evolving notion of deemed consolidation with fairness considerations 
derived from principles of marshalling might produce a workable structure for reorganizing 
corporate groups.  The process bears a family resemblance to the development of the equity 
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Creation of a web of guarantees by a consolidated group of companies 
is a business technique that breaks down the asset partitioning that results 
when a parent company owns one or more subsidiaries.  Typically, the asset 
partitioning that results from the division of assets among multiple legal 
entities predates the planning for the syndicated financing.  Thus, the 
guarantee web divides creditors between multiple source creditors and 
single source creditors, though it does not create the asset partitions. 
The pre-existing asset partition created by the parent/subsidiary 
structure may have been created for the express purpose of matching 
different creditors with different assets.140  In such a case, a substantive 
consolidation might defeat expectations of creditors who had advanced 
funds to the separate legal entities.  However, too often we forget that the 
pre-existing asset partition might have resulted from other factors.  Prior to 
his appointment to the Supreme Court, then professor William O. Douglas 
made this very point in a co-authored article.141
The factor of limited liability has not been unimportant.  It merely has not been 
paramount.  The same can be said for the evolution that has taken place within 
the business units unsing the corporate form.  Recent years especially have 
seen an increasing use of the subsidiary-parent structure. . . .  The reasons for 
the use of this structure are manifold.  The increased facility in financing; the 
desire to escape the difficulty . . . of qualifying the parent company as a foreign 
corporation in a particular state; the avoidance of complications involved in the 
purchase of physical assets; the retention of good will of an established 
business unit; the avoidance of taxation; the avoidance of cumbersome 
management structures; the desire for limited liability, are among the primary 
motives.  The desire for limited liability has been merely one among many 
receivership out of traditional foreclosure law used initially to reorganize railroads.  See 
generally SKEEL, supra note 61, at 57 (discussing development of equity receivership device).  
In an equity receivership, a court could order the sale of all the assets of a railroad in a single 
parcel at auction.  This procedure produced a different result than might have obtained if 
mortgages or judgments liens filed in individual counties and held by separate creditor groups 
were subject to separate foreclosure proceedings in a fragmented liquidation.
140
 Professors Hannsman and Kraakman contemplated such a scenario in their initial 
presentation of their theory of asset partitioning.  See Hannsman & Kraakman, supra note 11.  
Professor Triantis contemplates a similar regime in his analysis of internal capital markets.  
See Triantis, supra note 56.  I examine a different sector of consolidated corporate groups—
the world in which the internal asset partitions no longer serve the purpose of the group, yet 
the partition remains because it is cheaper to leave it in place than to dismantle it.  In my 
experience, this is a common situation.
141
 William O. Douglas & Carol M. Shanks, Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary 
Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193 (1929).  Justice Douglas’ views on corporate form have 
particular interest in the context of corporate reorganization because he and his cohorts at the 
Securities and Exchange Commission reflected anti-Wall Street, populist philosophy in the 
Chandler Act reforms of 1938.  See SKEEL, supra note 61, at 18.
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factors.  And at times it has appeared to recede.142
Though use of the same business technique—application of the 
corporate form—appears in any corporate group, Douglas reminds us of a 
basic reality.  The presence of the business technique does not mean the 
same thing in all contexts.  Context sensitivity should guide equitable 
considerations.
The squeeze down effect caused by intercompany guarantees becomes 
clear with a simple example.  Suppose you are an investor with $100 
allocated to purchase an outstanding corporate debt as an investment.  You 
have a choice between purchasing a $100 note from two different borrowers 
with very different corporate structures.  The first borrower, a single 
corporation with no subsidiaries, owns assets worth $2000 and owes third 
party creditors claims totaling $1000.  The second borrower is a member of 
a corporate group composed of 6 corporations; your investment might 
consist of a loan to any of these corporations.  The corporate group owns 
assets in various entities with a consolidated value of $2000 and group
members owe third party creditors claims totaling $1000, of which $500 is 
owed to various third party lenders and $500 is owed to a lending syndicate 
with intercompany guarantees.  A Co. distributes proceeds from the 
syndicated loan throughout the consolidated group, as needed. In general, 
which investment should you prefer?  You might answer this question by 
considering what happens if the stand-alone company and the consolidated 
group each lose $1700, leaving only $300 in realizable asset value.  The 
chart below illustrates the situation for the consolidated group and its debt 
investors.
Entity Values Third Party 
Creditors
Syndicate
Loans
Syndicate
Claim Amount
Syn.
Dist.
3rd-P 
Dist.
A $50 $-0- 5 x $100 $500 $50 -0- 
B $50 $100 -0- $500 $41.67 $8.33
C $50 $100 -0- $500 $41.67 $8.33
D $50 $100 -0- $500 $41.67 $8.33
E $50 $100 -0- $500 $41.67 $8.33
F $50 $100 -0- $500 $41.67 $8.33
Total $300 $500 $500 N/A $258.35 $41.55
There is a significant structural reason to prefer holding a $100
syndicated loan in the second company over holding either a $100 claim 
against the first company or an independent third party claim against a 
member of a consolidated group in the second company.143  In the first, 
142
 Douglas & Shanks, id., at 193.
143
 This structural reason supplements any preference for a claim against a larger asset pool 
rather than a smaller asset pool based on notions of risk diversification.  
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stand-alone corporation, the $100 debt investment receives a distribution of 
$30 because a total of $1000 in claims compete pari passu for $300 in 
assets.  This would be true even if $500 of these claims were made by 
syndicated lenders because, in the absence of subsidiaries and guarantees, 
the syndicated lender claims simply compete on a pari passu basis with 
other third party claims.  In the consolidated group, however, the syndicated 
lender holding a $100 claim receives a distribution of $51.67, while the 
independent third party lender to receives a distribution of $8.33 (in the 
absence of substantive consolidation).
The reason for the vast difference in outcome relates to the 
phenomenon of double proof.  The syndicated lenders to the consolidated 
group file proofs of claim for $500 against each member in the group 
because each member in the group provided a full, complete and 
unconditional guarantee of payment, not simply collection, to support the 
syndicated loan.  This $500 squeezes down the recoveries of independent 
creditors of the individual group members.  This would not have occurred if 
the individual group members had each arranged for their own separate 
financing, rather than having one member in the group, typically the parent 
company, arrange for centralized financing.  The squeeze down effect in the 
context of intercompany guarantees magnifies the problem of double proof.
In the example, we have not merely a simple problem of double proof but 
the problem of a sixfold proof.  In general, the squeeze down effect is 
enhanced as the number of guarantees from separate legal entities increases.
In the above example, the small independent creditors are squeezed 
down, while the organized syndicated lenders receive an enhanced recovery.  
A variety of fairness considerations may lead one to question the 
appropriateness of this result.  First, the small independent creditors may be 
“non-adjusting” creditors (such as tort claimants) or they may be voluntary 
creditors with little or no bargaining power.  We might have a simple case 
in which the transaction costs needed to provide guarantees to the voluntary 
little guys are perceived to be too high.  These concerns echo those raised 
during the secured lending “carve-out” debate in which it was proposed that 
secured lenders and borrowers set aside 20% of collateral value for payment 
of non-adjusting and other unsecured creditors.144
144 See supra note 6.  The concerns raised by the guarantee squeeze down relate directly to 
analysis performed by Professor LoPucki.  See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 
YALE L.J. 1 (1996); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment 
Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REV. 147 (1998).  With the example of a single economic firm dividing 
itself into multiple subsidiary entities, we see how easily one may squeeze down—
theoretically to almost nothing—the claims of small voluntary creditors who deal with the 
entity only through one of its subsidiary nodes, as well as the claims of tort claimants who 
may be directly injured through contact with a subsidiary node.  In contrast, if the firm had not 
organized itself into multiple subsidiary entities, the same economic activity—organized as a 
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An additional fairness consideration presents itself.  The squeeze down 
effect operates much like a security interest in two ways.  In the above 
example, the asset partition provided by A Co. gave the syndicated lenders 
complete priority in $50 of assets.  In the case of the five group members in 
which independent lenders competed with the syndicate, the repetition of 
the large, $500 proofs of claim by the syndicate, created a distinct 
advantage, though not a complete priority.  Unlike the priority created by 
secured credit which requires some form of public notice for perfection, 
syndicated guarantees squeeze without systematic notice.  In the case of 
public companies, it would be unusual to find any useful information on the 
extent of guarantee webs either in financial statements or SEC filings.  In 
practice, of course, even the presence of notice is of no help to non-
adjusting creditors and may be of little help to small voluntary creditors.  
Nevertheless, the presence or absence of notice often figures prominently in 
our assessement of overall fairness of a structure.  I mean to suggest here 
only that, if secured lending presents fairness problems, the unsecured 
syndicated guarantee may be the 800 pound gorilla in the corner that goes
unnoticed.
I propose a third justification to use substantive consolidation, also 
grounded in equity—but based on equitable considerations that sound in 
fairness rather than notions of responding to affirmative wrongs, such as 
misrepresentation, fraud and the like.  Simply put, substantive consolidation 
doctrine can be used to balance the equities when we find that intercompany 
guarantees divide creditors into various camps of single source creditors 
competing with a multiple source creditor who benefits from the web of 
intercompany guarantees.  Substantive consolidation in this context removes 
the unfairness of the squeeze down effect.  This notion of fairness, though 
articulated by courts for the structure of business enterprises in past times, 
has not found a voice with modern courts.145
single legal entity—would provide a greater payout to the small contract creditor and the tort 
claimant.  In the consolidated group structure, using a web of guarantees, the sophisticated 
financier, reduces its exposure to these types of claims, enhancing its recovery.  Though it is 
beyond the scope of this Article, my analysis may have relevance to the treatment of 
consolidated group liability for tort claims—a much debated issue.  See, e.g., Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate 
Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and 
Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to 
Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1 (1986).
145
 On this third rationale for substantive consolidation, the lower court properly ordered 
substantive consolidation in Owens Corning.  Far from surprising, this is the result that 
industry professionals would have expected in the case of unsecured inter-company 
guarantees.  Indeed, this is the significance of the fact, given little credence by the Third 
Circuit, that no competent lawyer would have given a non-consolidation opinion in the face of 
a web of inter-company guarantees.
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My remarks on the fairness rationale are intended to be descriptive as 
much as normative.  I expect many would cringe at the idea of advocating 
for a legal regime based on fuzzy notions such as fairness when notions of 
economic efficiency present a seemingly analytical bright line.  I do not 
engage that debate here.  The current bankruptcy law expressly includes 
doctrines of equity in the bankruptcy judge’s toolbox.  In cases of 
disagreement over approval of reorganization plans in a cram down context, 
the statute expressly instructs judges to consider both the fairness and the 
equity of the plan.146  Historically, considerations of fairness and equity 
have been raised in situations in which multiple source creditors compete 
with single source creditors.  At the time these fairness issues were 
developed, the general partnership dominated business, while the corporate 
form did not permit organization of corporate groups.  Nevertheless, a long 
pedigree should not disqualify current use.  The foregoing analysis would be 
all for naught, however, if the Supreme Court did not permit the evolution 
of equitable principles in the manner that I suggest.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS OVER EVOLUTION OF EQUITY PRINCIPLES
In proposing my third rationale for substantive consolidation, I am 
mindful of the Supreme Court’s decision in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo 
S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.147  In that decision, authored by Justice 
Scalia, the Supreme Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that a federal court’s 
equity jurisdiction is limited to the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the 
High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution and the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789.148 The idea is 
flexibility within limits.149
146
 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(1) (Code year).
147
 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
148
 The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal courts jurisdiction over “all suits . . . in equity.” § 
11, 1 Stat. 78.  In fixing the scope of this jurisdiction to the time of separation of the United 
States from England, the Supreme Court relied on Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I.S., Inc., 306 U.S. 
563, 568 (1939).  Accord Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (“The judicial power 
created by Art. III § 1, of the Constitution is not whatever judges choose to do . . . or even 
whatever Congress chooses to assign them, . . .  It is the power to act in the manner traditional 
for English and American courts.”); cf. In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(noting that § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code does not justify vendor relief because the power 
given by the section implements, rather than overrides, provisions of the Code); Jamo v. 
Katahdin Fed. Credit Union (In re Jamo), 283 F.3d 392, 403 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that the 
equitable power conferred by § 105 may be used only if “the equitable remedy dispensed by 
the court is necessary to preserve an identifiable right conferred elsewhere in the Bankruptcy 
Code”).
149
 The Supreme Court clearly stated that bankruptcy courts “are essentially courts of equity, 
and their proceedings inherently proceedings in equity.”  Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 
234, 240 (1934).  A bankruptcy court employs principles and rules of equity within the 
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As a general matter, the Constitution provides that federal courts 
acquire power only through legislative grant;150 thus, for a bankruptcy court 
properly to assert power to impose substantive consolidation, particular 
legislation must give the court power to use this remedy.151  The Court 
found that the equity powers Congress conferred pursuant to the Judiciary 
Act were limited to those exercised by the High Court of Chancery in 1789.  
Thus, if the remedy of substantive consolidation did not exist at that time, 
another act of Congress must be found that did confer such power.  Given 
Grupo Mexicano, the question remains whether Congress has chosen to 
confer the power to order substantive consolidation on the federal courts in 
any particular piece of legislation.152
The Grupo Mexicano decision generated a flurry of speculation153 that 
the Court had deprived bankruptcy courts of the ability to order substantive 
consolidation. First, accepted wisdom holds that the Supreme Court tacitly 
approved substantive consolidation doctrine in 1941, in Sampsell v. 
Imperial Paper & Color Corp.154—far too recent if Grupo Mexicano
requires a much older equitable practice to sustain its use.  The evolution of 
jurisdiction given it by the Bankruptcy Code and Title 28 of the United States Code.  See
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939).  Bankruptcy courts use principles of equity to 
counteract fraud, to insure that form does not triumph over substance and to stop technical 
considerations from preventing substantial justice.  Id.  Bankruptcy courts have considerable 
latitude to modify debtor/creditor relationships.  United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 
549 (1990).
150
 In addition to the equity jurisdiction conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has 
specifically granted federal courts jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases.  28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Code 
year).  A separate clause of the Constitution provides Congress with the power to establish 
uniform bankruptcy laws.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (stating that Congress may “establish ... 
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”).
151
 One might ask whether courts have certain mandatory powers under Article III of the 
Constitution, without the requirement of an act of Congress, thus focusing on the Constitution 
rather than the Judiciary Act of 1789.  See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article 
III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985); Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).  I do not see provision of certain equitable remedies as 
mandated by the structure of the Constitution and thus search for authority in grants of power 
by Congress to the courts.
152 See Nw. Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (stating that “whatever 
equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the 
confines of the Bankruptcy Code”).
153 See, e.g., Sabin Willett, The Doctrine of Robin Hood: A Note on “Substantive 
Consolidation”, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 87 (2005); Daniel B. Bogart, Resisting the 
Expansion of Bankruptcy Court Power Under Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code: The All 
Writs Act and an Admonition from Chief Justice Marshall, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 793, 810 (2003); 
J. Maxwell Tucker, Grupo Mexicano and the Death of Substantive Consolidation, 8 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 427 (2000).
154
 313 U.S. 215 (1941).
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business forms presents a further complication; in 1789, corporations could
not own subsidiaries, so the High Court of Chancery had no opportunity to 
order the remedy of substantive consolidation between a parent and a 
subsidiary corporation.
Since Grupo Mexicano, however, no federal court has found that 
substantive consolidation is unavailable; and, several courts have 
specifically approved the use of substantive consolidation.155  One might 
distinguish Grupo Mexicano on the grounds that bankruptcy jurisdiction 
derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1334, and not the Judiciary Act of 1789; but 
significantly absent from the current jurisdictional grant to federal courts 
exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction is an express grant of general equitable 
powers—a grant formerly present (including at the time of Sampsell) but no 
longer in effect.156  The Bankruptcy Code itself, in § 1123(a)(5)(C), 
provides the option of merger or consolidation157 as available to implement 
a reorganization plan, but that section has been termed a slender reed upon 
which approval for substantive consolidation might rest.158
A. A STATUTORY FOUNDATION
The lack of an extant general grant of equitable powers to federal courts 
exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction is both surprising and troubling.  Section 
105 of the Bankruptcy Code,159 often cited as a possible supplemental 
source of equity powers, appears limited to the use of equity to carry out 
express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  Accepting this limitation, for 
155 See, e.g., In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 209 n. 14 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that “[w]hat 
the Court has given as an equitable remedy remains until it alone removes it or Congress 
declares it removed as an option”).
156
 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the Chandler Act of 1938 and the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 
all contained a grant of general equitable jurisdiction.  This grant was dropped, likely by 
mistake, when Congress “fixed” problems with the 1978 Code identified by the Supreme 
Court in N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
157 Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 302 (Code year) (providing for consolidation of the estates of a husband 
and wife in joint administration).
158 See Douglas Baird, Substantive Consolidation Today (2005) available at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/usa/Substantive_Consolidation_5.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 
2006).  Section 1123(a) of the Bankruptcy contemplates that a debtor may merge or 
consolidate with another person as part of implementing a plan of reorganization, though no 
specific authorization for substantive consolidation or deemed consolidation expressly appears 
in the Code.  11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(C) (Code year).  The references to merger and 
consolidation likely refer to state law corporate procedures implemented by filing with the 
applicable secretary of state.  Substantive consolidation might involve combining estates of a 
natural person with a corporation, as in Sampsell—a special bankruptcy procedure clearly not 
involving a state law business combination.
159
 11 U.S.C. § 105 (Code year).
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the sake of argument, if I had to locate in the Bankruptcy Code the power of 
a bankruptcy court to act generally as a court of equity or to order an 
equitable remedy in furtherance of substantive consolidation, I would turn 
to the definition of “claim” in Section 101, which has two parts.
(5) The term “claim” means—
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, 
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach 
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable 
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, 
disputed, secured, or unsecured.160
It appears from the definition that rights to payment can be equitable in 
nature.  Further, holders of some claims may be entitled to an equitable 
remedy.  The language of the definition allows a creditor to assert its 
entitlement to an equitable remedy as part of, or in addition to, its assertion 
of the claim (regardless of whether the claim itself is equitable in nature).161
Under Bankruptcy Code § 502,162 a claim is deemed allowed unless a party 
in interest objects.  Following an objection, the court, after notice and 
hearing, determines the amount of the claim and whether to allow it.
This definition of “claim” arrived on the scene in 1978163 as a 
significant change in law—well after the doctrine of substantive 
consolidation was recognized in the federal courts—and so one might 
160
 11 U.S.C. § 101 (Code year).
161
 The Bankruptcy Code provides that, as a principle of interpretation, “or” is to be 
interpreted as inclusive, rather than exclusive. 11 U.S.C. § 102 (5) (Code year).
162
 11 U.S.C. § 502 (Code year).
163
 The definition of the term “claim” introduced in 1978 created a significant departure from 
the previous law.  See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 21-22 (1978), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978 (1979); accord H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
at 309 (1977), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 
1978 (1979).  The definition permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court to 
include equitable as well as legal rights to payment.  Id.; see also Ohio v. Kovaks, 469 U.S. 
274, 279 (1985) (recognizing that Congress desired a broad definition of a “claim” in 
bankruptcy); In re Caldor, Inc.-N.Y., 240 B.R. 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 266 B.R. 
575 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that the drafters of §101 (5) of the Bankruptcy Code gave the 
term “claim” a broad definition in order to ensure that all those with potential calls on a 
debtor’s assets, provided that the call in at least some circumstances could give rise to suit for 
payment, came before the court so that their demands could be allowed or disallowed and 
their priority and dischargeability determined).
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conclude that, when Congress decided that claims for payment may be 
equitable in nature and that entitlement to an equitable remedy might form 
part of a claim, it also intended to include substantive consolidation within 
the ambit of an equitable claim to payment or within the scope of the term 
“equitable remedy,” or both.  This follows simply from the fact that, by 
1978, federal courts had developed substantive consolidation as an equitable 
remedy and creditors often implored courts to use their equity powers of 
substantive consolidation to expand the universe of assets available to pay 
their debts.  Thus, the year 1978, rather than the year 1789, becomes the 
date to measure the extent of “equity.”
The impediment to such an analysis is the question whether a creditor 
actually can request substantive consolidation as part of its assertion of an 
equitable claim or its entitlement to an equitable remedy.164  Certainly, 
creditors do not assert a right to substantive consolidation outside of 
bankruptcy.  However, the issue of substantive consolidation might arise in 
the following setting.  Company A is a parent and Company B is its 
subsidiary.  Creditor C loaned money to B.  Both A and B file for 
bankruptcy and the cases are procedurally consolidated.  C files a proof of a 
“legal” claim against B based on B’s prior execution of a note evidencing 
C’s loan to B.  C also files a proof of an equitable claim against A, asserting 
that, under principles of veil piercing, C is entitled to be paid from A’s 
assets as well as from B’s assets.  Assume C would be entitled to assert a 
state law veil piercing claim outside of bankruptcy.  Veil piercing is 
considered an equitable remedy.165
In determining whether to allow C’s claim against A, the court must 
decide, in effect, whether to substantively consolidate A with B.  The court 
might conclude that, in respecting C’s claim against A, it should consolidate 
A with B so that all creditors of B benefit from the break down in the asset 
partition occasioned by C’s equitable claim.166  If C’s equitable claim 
164 In re Antonino, 241 B.R. 883 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (“A ‘claim’ exists for bankruptcy 
purposes only if the relationship between debtor and creditor contains all of the elements 
necessary to give rise to a legal obligation under relevant non-bankruptcy law.”).
165
 It is widely acknowledged that corporate veil piercing has evolved into an equitable 
doctrine.  See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in 
Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28 CONN. L. REV. 295, 330 
(1996) (describing the doctrine of corporate veil piercing as "a creation of nineteenth century 
equity jurisprudence under which equity courts disregard corporate forms where required to 
prevent fraud"); see also I. MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION 
AND ALLIED CORPORATION PROBLEMS 44 (1927) (“It has been oftentimes stated that courts 
of law invariably adhere to the entity theory even though gross miscarriages of justice result. 
It is quite true that equity, less abashed by forms or fictions than a court of law, is more 
willing to draw aside the veil and look at the real parties in interest.”)
166
 In the case of a fraudulent conveyance claim, a bankruptcy court will not allow a creditor 
in C’s position to assert a fraudulent conveyance claim against A.  Instead, the trustee asserts 
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against A is justified, then the court would have found, in effect, that A was 
the alter ego of B, that B was a mere instrumentality of A, or some similar 
identity pursuant to which the asset partition between A and B should not be 
respected.  Though a court might ignore the asset partition for C’s benefit 
(in effect consolidating for C alone in a form of “deemed consolidation”) 
but respect the asset partition for the other creditors of B, it need not do 
so.
167
  Often, a bankruptcy court asserts claims for the benefit of the entire 
estate that, outside of bankruptcy, would have been asserted by a single 
creditor for its own benefit.168
Further, if the court were to allow C’s equitable claim to stand against 
A without ordering a substantive consolidation, the court would create the 
problem of a double proof benefiting C.  In other contexts, we have seen 
that courts strive to limit double proof.  In employing substantive 
consolidation to avoid the dilemma (both of double proof and of 
inconsistent treatment of the asset partition), the court merely employs
substantive consolidation as part of evaluating and allowing proof of an 
equitable claim.  The court must evaluate claims as part of its 
responsibilities under § 502.169  Thus, in imposing substantive 
consolidation, the court is using the equity powers given it under § 105 to 
carry out its responsibility under another specific provision of the 
Bankruptcy Code.
By the foregoing analysis, I do not mean to suggest that, in cases of 
substantive consolidation, the issue of the consolidation remedy actually 
arises because creditors have filed multiple proofs of equitable claims.  I 
have never seen such a case.170  Analytically, however, a creditor’s request 
the claim against A for the benefit of all creditors of B.  This is true even though, outside of 
bankruptcy, C’s fraudulent conveyance claim against A would benefit only C.  See, e.g., Am. 
Nat’l Bank v. MortgageAm. Corp. (In re Mortgage Am. Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 
1983).
167
 The Third Circuit speculates that such a split treatment might be available to a court. 419 
F.3d at 210, n.16..  However, in light of the Third Circuit’s apparent hostility to “deemed” 
consolidations, it is not apparent how the Third Circuit would support use of split treatment 
unless it did so under the simple principles of claim evaluation advocated here.
168See In re Mortgage Am. Corp., 714 F.2d at 1266.
169
 11 U.S.C. § 502 (Code year).
170
 In an interesting twist on filing proofs of claim, one creditor in the Enron bankruptcy failed 
to file proofs of claim against all relevant entities, arguing that it did not do so because it 
expected a substantive consolidation in which its single proof of claim would have sufficed.  
See In re Enron Corp., 419 F.3d 115 (2005). An example of an equitable proof of claim based 
on veil piercing appears in Expert Report of Jonathan R. Macey, In re Stone & Webster, No. 
00- 2142, 2005 WL 3263064 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 22, 2005) (finding that “[u]nder traditional 
corporate law rules regarding piercing the corporate veil, BVG&E was the alter ego of Stone 
& Webster [and] should, therefore, be responsible for BVG&E’s debts”).
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for substantive consolidation amounts to the filing of a proof of an equitable 
claim against every member of a consolidated group for which that creditor 
does not have a legal claim (such as the legal claim the creditor would have 
through a note or a guarantee).  Objection to use of substantive 
consolidation by a party in interest amounts to objection to allowance of the 
equitable claim.  Indeed, if courts found that substantive consolidation must 
pass through the eye of a proof of equitable claim under § 502, I would 
expect to see the filing of such proofs proliferate.
I intend the above discussion to strengthen the statutory basis for use of 
substantive consolidation despite the apparent gap in general bankruptcy 
equity jurisdiction created when 28 U.S.C. § 1481 was repealed in response 
to Northern Pipeline.171  Though I believe a court might fairly accept my 
statutory analysis to justify use of substantive consolidation, the reasons for 
its acceptance go much deeper and, I believe, are much older, tracing back 
to England in 1673.
B. AN OLD CASE
The prior analysis of marshalling, double proof and the so-called 
“bankruptcy rule” for undersecured creditors suggests that courts of equity 
have long balanced the general question of fairness between multiple source 
creditors and single source creditors.  The label “substantive consolidation”
is simply the name for a procedure pursuant to which, among other things, 
traditional questions of fairness might be addressed if members of a 
corporate group execute intercompany guarantees and later file for 
bankruptcy.  Contrary to the accepted wisdom that pre-1789 chancery 
practice did not sanction a consolidation remedy, I find approval for a 
consolidation remedy in the 1676 chancery case of Brown & Naylor.172  The 
case arose from a bill of review brought to reverse the 1673 decree in 
Naylor v. Brown.173
In Naylor v. Brown, Naylor loaned 500£ to the Company of 
Woodmongers.  The Company also owed debts to thirteen of its members 
totaling 620£.  The Company owned a bond of 1000£ due from the King.  
The Company assigned the bond to Sir William Wild, who declared a trust 
171 See supra note 156.
172
 73 Selden Society (1954), No. 557 at 419.  I learned of the case through work on the early 
history of asset partitioning by Dr. McNair and Dr. Getzler.  See Joshua Getzler & Michael 
McNair, The firm as an entity before the Companies Acts, in ADVENTURES OF THE LAW: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE, DUBLIN 2003 267-
88 (Dublin: Four Courts Press, Paul Brand, Kevin Costello & W.N. Osborough eds. 2005).
173
 Rep Temp Finch 83, 23 E.R. 44, sub nom. Naylor & Godfrey (1674), 73 Selden Society, 
No. 97 at 55-6.
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for 620£ of the bond in favor of the thirteen member creditors, and as to the 
residue, in favor of the Company.  Then, the Company declared a second 
trust on the Company’s residual interest to twenty-five other persons 
claiming debts (who also appear to be members).  This state of affairs 
remained until a quo warranto was brought against the Company, resulting 
in its dissolution.  Following the dissolution, the various member creditors 
claimed the bond except for a 135£ residue for the unrelated creditors, 
including Naylor.  Naylor and the other third party creditors sued Brown, 
the master of the Woodmongers, and the thirteen members of the Company 
who benefited from the Wild declaration of trust.  Lord Nottingham held for 
Naylor and the other third party creditors, directing an accounting for the 
620£ and granting priority to Naylor and the other third party creditors over 
the thirteen insider creditors.
Three key points emerge from a close reading of these cases: first, I 
suggest the parties conceived of the two declared trusts as an analog to 
modern corporate subsidiaries174 because each trust was seen as a separate 
corpus within the Company; second, the court ignored one trust based upon 
a failure to observe proper formalities in its formation, despite a later 
ratification; and, third, on appeal, the court considered a defendant-proposed 
alternate remedy: combine the two trusts with the Company in “a kind of 
average” and satisfy all creditors from the common pool.  Lord Nottingham 
remarked that such an alternate consolidated solution was “fair” (without 
excepting the properly formed second trust) but he declined to adopt it 
because of the taint of fraud and the failure of the Woodmongers to raise the 
possibility of consolidation earlier.
The dog that did not bark in Brown v. Naylor is the absence of any 
mention of the fraudulent conveyance remedy (particularly odd because 
Lord Nottingham was one of the promoters of the Statute of Frauds).175
Why did not Naylor argue that the initial assignment of the bond to Sir 
William Wild resulted in a violation of the Statute of Elizabeth?  I suggest 
that a transaction form consisting of (i) an absolute assignment of the bond 
to Sir William, coupled with (ii) the grant back to the Company of a residual 
interest in the trust created by Sir William, was not seen as a transfer of the 
174
 In three essays, Maitland provides authority for the early connection between the trust and 
the corporation.  See Maitland, The Unincorporate Body, Trust and Corporation and Moral 
Personality and Legal Personality, H. D. HAZELTINE, ET. AL., MAITLAND, SELECTED 
ESSAYS (1936).
And now let me once more repeat that the connection between Trust and 
Corporation is very ancient.  It is at least four centuries old.  Henry VIII saw it.
Id. at 214.
175 See Introduction cii, 73 Selden Society (1954) (noting Lord Nottingham as a promoter of 
the Statute of Frauds).
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bond outside the estate of the Company.  Rather, this business structure was 
seen at the time as analogous to dropping an asset into a subsidiary 
company in today’s corporate world.  This account explains both why a 
fraudulent conveyance action was not brought and why the criticism of the 
transaction advanced in 1673 had any currency.
In 1673, the Naylor v. Brown court reasoned that the first trust failed 
because the Company either (i) had not joined in the authorization to create 
the trust, (ii) had not authorized Sir William to create the trust under 
Company seal, or (iii) had not authorized Sir William to declare the trust by 
any corporate act.  This reasoning only makes sense if the initial assignment 
of the bond to Sir William, coupled with the grant of a residual interest in 
the trust back to the Company, failed to remove the bond from the estate of 
the Company.  Significantly, the 1673 court does not remark that the initial 
assignment to Sir William was defective; rather, it stated that the 
“Declaration of the Trust” was void.176  If the assignment of the bond to Sir 
William had resulted in an absolute assignment outside the estate of the 
Company, then Sir William needed no approval from the Company or its 
seal to create a trust for the thirteen creditors or the Company.  With an 
absolute assignment of the bond, he could have created the first trust under 
his own signature.  On appeal in 1676, the defendants did not argue this 
point.  Instead, they argued that the Company had ratified the first trust 
when it approved the second trust because the recitals for the second trust 
mentioned the creation of the first trust and its residual interest.  The 1676 
court rejected this argument.
From the above, I conclude that the first trust transaction structure—an 
absolute assignment of property, followed by the creation of a trust, with the 
residual of the trust remaining in the Company—was a technique designed 
to keep the bond within the estate of the Company for the express purpose
of preventing a fraudulent conveyance challenge based on the Statute of 
Elizabeth.  Several additional factors support the conclusion that the trusts 
remained within the estate of the Company.  The first trust included an 
express assignment of a residual interest back to the Company.  The second 
trust, apparently properly formed, did not contain any language reciting a 
residual interest in favor of the Company.  Yet, the residual interest in the 
second trust did return to the Company.  Why this difference and result?  I 
suggest that the creation of the second trust by the Company grant was 
understood as not effecting an absolute transfer of the residual interest in the 
first trust outside the Company’s estate.  No mention was made of the 
176
 Given the reporting standards of the day, any argument based on silence can only be a 
probable argument.  Arguments stated in court simply might not have been recorded.  In a 
case such as this, however, in which we have multiple reports and an appeal, the argument 
from silence appears much stronger.
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treatment of the residual interest in the second trust because of this 
understanding.  Thus, the two trusts in this case, formed by different 
procedures, were intended to create asset partitions within the Company 
itself.  If the parties conceived of the two trusts as existing within the estate 
of the Company, it further explains why the members of the Company 
waited until dissolution to extract proceeds from the bond.177
A second critical question remains.  Why did Lord Nottingham consider 
the proposal to consolidate both trusts with the Company to be a “fair” 
proposal?  Certainly, the consolidation of the first trust with the Company 
might be considered fair given that the proper formalities were not observed 
in its formation.  But what could have made consolidation of the second 
trust fair?  I suggest that the multiple signatures of Company members on 
Naylor’s debt would have sustained this result.  The court takes care to point 
out that none of these member signatures on the debt bound any of the 
members personally.  However, the multiple signatures created the 
impression that the Company members nevertheless supported payment of 
Naylor’s debt.  Use of a trust, even the properly formed second trust, to 
prefer claims of members ran counter to the impression created by the 
Company.
We might further ask: why did the Woodmongers suggest the 
consolidation remedy and why did Lord Nottingham decline to impose it, 
even though it was a “fair” solution?  My tentative answer lies in the 
sketchy recitals of the relative amounts of the claims that we are given in the 
various reports.  We are told that Naylor and the other third party creditors 
are owed 1200£.  The first thirteen insider creditors are owed 650£ by the 
time of the appeal and the second group of twenty five creditors are owed 
250£.  Thus, we have a ratio of 3 insider claims to 4 outsider claims.  With a 
total fund of approximately 1000£ from the King’s bond, a pro rata
distribution to all creditors resulting from a consolidation would yield 
approximately 429£ to the insider creditors and 516£ to the third party 
creditors.  Leaving the original decree in place (which did not attack the 
second trust) apportioned 650£ to the third party creditors from the first 
trust, 250£ to the inside creditors from the second trust, and, we are told,178
a residual of 135£ to the third party creditors from the second trust.
177
 I do not place great emphasis on this timing point because, from the version of the case in 
Seldon’s Reports, it appears that the trusts may have been formed just prior to the liquidation 
and, indeed, as a device in anticipation of the liquidation.  This, however, makes the absence 
of a fraudulent conveyance claim all the more unusual.
178
 The amount of the claims reported is slightly inconsistent among the various reports and, in 
any event, the precise amounts available for distribution can not be reconciled without 
assuming interest on the King’s bond.
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Based on the distribution percentages, we can see why, as a collective, 
the Woodmongers suggested the consolidation remedy—consolidation 
enhanced their recovery.  Also, we can see why, based on suspicion of fraud 
including, perhaps, inflated debt claims by the insiders, the court simply 
affirmed the 1673 ruling—the only matter really before the court.  The court 
might have liked the idea of consolidating both trusts with the Company 
(and then subordinating the insiders), but that issue did not present itself on 
appeal because the 1673 case addressed only the first trust.  Thus, Lord 
Nottingham approved the concept of consolidating multiple artificial entities 
as a fair remedy, though he declined to impose it in this particular case.
What I take away from the foregoing analysis and the dicta in Naylor & 
Brown is that, if consolidation of two internal trusts with a company had 
been requested of Lord Nottingham in 1677, the Chancellor would have 
considered the request as being one for an appropriate equitable remedy.  I 
am not aware of counterexamples to his approval of consolidation as a 
remedy.  Though the case does not present the consolidation of two 
“bankrupts,” the facts are tantalizingly close to a modern substantive 
consolidation.  Importantly, it is the feature of consolidation itself, more 
than the nature of trusts, that resonates here.  One might disagree that the 
trusts were conceived of as separate entities.  One might further disagree 
that the trusts were seen as existing within the company.  Nevertheless, the 
trusts did form a primitive asset partition however one otherwise conceives 
of them.  The court remarked favorably upon the proposal to consolidate the 
asset partitions, though it declined to do so.179  Unlike the facts in Grupo 
Mexicano in which historically a creditor’s bill was not requested and given 
prior to judgment—the fatal flaw identified by Justice Scalia—consolidation 
of asset partitions, if not distinct legal entities, was considered appropriate 
prior to 1789.
Beyond finding a prototype of substantive consolidation approved prior 
to the Judiciary Act of 1789, my belief in substantive consolidation as an 
appropriate remedy also stems from my belief that business fraud simply 
assumes new forms based on the existing legal technology available to 
miscreants.  The same might be said of patterns of business advantage that 
do not rise to the level of fraud.  Reading Naylor & Brown reminded me of
179
 Dr. McNair and Dr. Getzler note the early respect given to asset partitioning as a liability 
shield between investors and business activity in the reluctance of the court in Naylor v. 
Brown to hold the members of the Woodmongers personally liable for Company debts.  
Interestingly, in a note to the Finch reports on Naylor v. Brown (not reproduced in Elizabeth’s 
Reports), the idea of the company as a liability shield is traced to civil law.  I understand from 
Dr. Getzler that, whether a “fund” held together by fiduciary law is separate from the entity it 
serves (and those individuals who contributed to the fund or who have claims against it) is a 
hard-fought question in modern English law.  Dr. McNair and Dr. Getzler should not be 
understood to agree or disagree with my analysis of Naylor &. Brown.
2006] Corporate Form and Substantive Consolidation 67
Associated Gas.180
Associated Gas presented the question whether the transfer of assets to 
a newly formed corporate subsidiary, followed by the incurrence of 
indebtedness by the new subsidiary, violates a negative pledge covenant that 
bound the parent/transferor to not create liens on its assets.  To circumvent 
the negative pledge clause, the miscreant simply created a series of 
structural priorities for new lenders,  using the asset partition created by a 
new subsidiary, to give the new lender priority.  The structure was clever 
because one could argue that technically the procedure did not involve the 
creation of any lien, mortgage or security interest, thus complying with the 
negative pledge covenant.  The court was unwilling to confirm that this 
technical approach avoided a covenant violation.
Harkening back to Naylor & Brown, with the precedent of Associated 
Gas in mind, I imagine counsel to the Woodmongers suggesting two 
internal trusts to create priority, without violating the Statute of Elizabeth, 
just as the miscreant in Associated Gas sought to avoid the negative pledge 
covenant.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Theoretical work on the corporate form as it exists inside corporate
groups, particularly in bankruptcy, lags behind scholarship focusing on 
more general aspects of the corporate form.  To close this gap, this Article 
has argued for a framework that organizes this particular undertheorized 
milieu in terms of (i) asset partitioning, (ii) artificial personality and (iii) 
asset identification.  Using these tools, we better understand the doctrine of 
substantive consolidation—a doctrine used to destroy the very asset 
partitioning function of the corporate form so important to our general 
understanding of that form outside consolidated group and insolvency 
contexts.  This analytical framework fills a desperate need because courts 
have settled for articulation of a number of tests (sometimes inconsistent) 
and a listing of factors that leaves the scope of substantive consolidation 
doctrine uncertain.
Some courts might feel more comfortable operating by direct appeal to 
unbounded notions of equity and fairness to reach what they consider the 
just result in particular cases.  This general approach, however, leads to 
uncertainty, promoting a feeling that no real standards exist—to modify a 
phrase, justice is measured by the length of a particular judge’s foot.181  A 
180 In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 61 F. Supp. 11, 29-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff’d, 149 F.2d 
996, 1004 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 736 (1945).
181
 I refer to Lord Seldon’s celebrated remark that the measure of equity is the length of the 
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concern over unbounded rules fueling an expansionist tendency of courts 
may explain the Supreme Court’s decision in Grupo Mexicano as an attempt 
to reign in the discretion afforded lower courts generally.  Further, 
uncertainty serves the interests of those creditors who view bankrutpcy as a 
somewhat lawless contest—a  form of legal roller derby—in which 
negotiations might take place.
This Article argued for an expanded rationale for use of substantive 
consolidation based on fairness concerns and gave reasons to deny a lending 
syndicate the benefit of a structural priority.  Though some might consider 
this project a liberal one—expanding both debtor rights against creditors, 
and rights of less powerful creditor classes against more powerful creditor 
classes—the project actually amounts to an inherently conservative one.  I 
am not inclined to believe that bankruptcy courts should be able to do 
whatever they like in the name of fairness and equity.  Rather, the better 
approach finds bankruptcy courts exercising their powers on a bounded 
playing field.  This only can be done, however, if the rules of the game are 
relatively clear.
Existing scholarship identifies principled reasons to believe that
bankruptcy law should not significantly alter the balance of rights between 
debtors and creditors established under non-bankruptcy law.182 Some have 
argued that a more expansive bankruptcy law that alters these rights might 
lead to expensive and inefficient contests reflecting the competition between 
those who favor the non-bankruptcy regime and those who favor the 
adjustments in rights made by bankruptcy law.183  While harmful forum 
shopping between bankruptcy courts certainly occurs in some settings,184
there seems to me only modest opportunity to forum shop between a 
bankrutpcy and a non-bankruptcy alternative.  Nevertheless, basic fairness 
and market predictability seem to recommend that differences between 
bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy regimes be minimized.  The proposals 
outlined in this Article are conservative in the sense that these differences 
are minimized.
By dividing the corporate form’s function into asset partitioning, 
artificial personality and asset identification, we can understand the different
contexts in which the corporate form appears.  In subsidiary corporations, 
Chancellor’s foot.
182 See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As (Is) 
Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2004).
183
 This position has been forcefully argued by leading bankruptcy scholars.  See generally
THOMAS JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY (1986).
184 See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE (2005).
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economic theory predicts that both artificial personality and asset 
identification will suffer.  The asset identification function remains a crucial 
part of creating asset partitions inside a subsidiary, while the artificial 
personality function serves no similar role.  Thus, it makes little sense to 
destroy an asset partition simply because a subsidiary has ceased to function 
as an artificial person in a consolidated group.  The economic rationale for 
substantive consolidation addresses breakdowns in the asset identification 
function on its own terms.  This analysis has particular relevance to the asset 
securitization business.
Asset securitization practices reflect a competition between a 
bankruptcy regime and a non-bankruptcy regime. We might ask why many 
companies who establish SPCs engage in seemingly pointless activities, 
such as subleasing office space to the SPC, printing separate SPC letterhead 
and procuring a separate phone line for the SPC.  All these activities are 
done in order to shield against the risk of substantive consolidation because 
the law, as presently articulated (one might say “muddled”), creates the risk 
that a simple breakdown in artificial personality may influence a 
consolidation decision.  Outside bankruptcy, the creditors can make current 
collections on securitized assets, such as receivables.  Inside bankruptcy, the 
automatic stay prevents current collections and collateral might be 
substituted.  To avoid the bankrutpcy regime, financiers engage in wasteful 
activities to maintain the fiction of the artificial person.
On the analysis given here, such wasteful activities might be eliminated.  
Within corporate groups, we should expect managers to minimize costs.  
This often involves promoting identities between parent and subsidiaries 
that destroy artificial personality.  It is little answer to claim that wasteful 
steps for SPCs, such as subleasing, stationary and telephones, are not really 
wasteful when we consider the overall cost savings realized from a 
securitized financing.  Though the decision to securitize is motivated by cost 
savings, waste is simply waste.  One thing that you can be sure of in a 
properly structured securitization is that the asset identification function will 
be operating smoothly.  Further, such a financing typically involves public 
filings to perfect asset transfers and security interests, alleviating traditional 
veil piercing concerns over misrepresentation and fraud.  When this is the 
case, the SPC and its investors should have no fears of substantive 
consolidation over lack of robust artificial personality at the SPC.
Though the reformulated economic rationale goes hand in glove with 
evidenciary concerns, the four scenarios of Necessity, Pareto, Kaldor-Hicks 
and Wealth Transfer provide reference points to frame any inquiry.  My 
suggestion that future courts develop a doctrine allowing recognition of 
partial consolidation resolves an overlap between situations of Necessity 
and Wealth Transfer, but the suggestion merely amounts to a welcome 
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refinement, not a reason to postpone implementation of reformulation of the 
doctrine more generally outlined in this Article.  A fear that creditors may 
not always make decisions in their narrow best interests, as limited to the
context of a single bankruptcy proceeding, suggests that courts should 
decide valuation disputes.  This conclusion follows reluctantly because, as a 
general matter, government may be less suited to valuation tasks than 
private parties.185  However, if a court orders substantive consolidation 
purely for reasons of cost savings on the reasonable belief that the remedy
benefits all creditors, we do not create a pernicious divide between
incentives inside and outside bankruptcy.  As a general rule, parties pursue 
cost savings and enhanced returns both inside and outside bankruptcy.
Reformulation of the veil piercing rationale directs the doctrine of 
substantive consolidation in a similarly conservative manner, back towards 
its origins, by reintroducing the prerequisite of identifying a wrong to be
corrected prior to use of the remedy under this rationale.  The traditional 
veil piercing remedy exists both inside and outside of bankruptcy court, so 
again the reformulation eliminates a potentially undesireable distinction.  By 
clearly recognizing two types of harm (i.e. the economic harm of decreased 
distributions versus the wrong that results from trouncing a reliance 
interest), we see how use of the veil piercing branch of substantive 
consolidation may remain effective.  A general creditor may not protest
against use of the remedy on veil piercing grounds simply because its use 
results in a wealth transfer.  The court has power to correct a wrong despite 
a purely economic based complaint arising from a diminished bankruptcy 
dividend.  In using substantive consolidation grounded in veil piercing, we 
require both that a substantial identity of parent and subsidiary must exist 
and that this identity must contribute to the original “wrong” that triggered
the remedy.  Breakdowns in either the management function or the asset 
identification function may contribute to causing a wrong suitable for 
correction in this context.  When a court makes the causal connection
between substantial identity and wrong, it may order substantive 
consolidation, subject only to respect for legitimate reliance interests.
This approach coheres with the corporate law notion that a creditor 
typically has no right to object to a consolidation, merger or dissolution—
pre-bankruptcy analogues to substantive consolidation.  Why should a 
creditor’s rights expand in bankruptcy, creating a hurdle for courts 
addressing particular harms, such as fraud, misrepresentation or covenant 
185 Cf. Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., 966 F.2d 273 (7 th Cir. 1992)(Judge Posner 
describing calculation of damages and suggesting that prices and costs are more accurately 
determined by parties in the market than by government.).  While, in general, markets may set 
prices better than instruments of government, government determination, such as by a court, 
may be preferred when we have reason to believe that a market imperfection may exist.
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breach?  The limit on court use of this power to correct also is clear.  The 
power may not be used under the veil piercing rationale to cause another 
wrong—typically destruction of a reliance interest.  However, this reliance 
interest should not be understood to exist simply because a creditor dealt 
with a particular subsidiary.  It will always be the case that a creditor dealt 
with a particular member of a consolidated group.  If the creditor did not 
have a particular contractual expectation of separateness—in effect, an 
ability to stop a merger, consolidation, dissolution or similar event outside 
of bankruptcy, then it makes little sense to expand that right within 
bankruptcy to sustain an objection to a consolidation procedure.
Lastly, the proposed fairness rationale for substantive consolidation is 
conservative for two reasons: it is grounded in historical practices and it 
coheres with accepted marketplace wisdom (at least, accepted prior to the 
Third Circuit’s decision in Owens Corning).  Prior to that decision, nobody 
thought that the presence of inter-company guarantees provided a reason not 
to consolidate companies.  Indeed, the market believed exactly the opposite.  
The presence of guarantees provided an affirmative reason to consolidate—
a reason so strong that no reputable law firm would give a non-
consolidation opinion in the face of such guarantees.
Recall that Professor Landers criticized Judge Posner for allowing an 
economic analysis to divert attention from the reality of actual cases in 
which he believed benefits flowed from the law mirroring the reality of a 
single economic enterprise.  The reformulation of substantive consolidation 
doctrine presented here does not overturn established default rules on 
difficult to prove efficiency grounds.  Rather, a substantive consolidation is 
proper under the fairness rationale when the entities themselves, by their 
very action of executing intercompany guarantees (or otherwise designating 
themselves as multiple-source creditors within a consolidated group), signal 
the reality of a single economic enterprise.  The step to consolidate under 
this rationale thus rests on specific and historical fairness considerations, 
grounded in accommodations between multiple source creditors and single 
source creditors.  I like to think that the market’s perception of guarantees 
and their impact on substantive consolidation doctrine might derive, in some 
sense, from collective memories of fairness considerations that operated in 
past times.186
186
 Future consideration should be given to the effect that veil piercing statutes, such as the 
joint and several liability of consolidated group members for federal income taxes, should 
have on the analysis.  Further work remains to be done on the arithmetic of the squeeze down 
effect, including analysis of its operation at varying degrees of insolvency.  Computation of 
the subrogation effects when a guarantee squeeze down results in full payment to certain 
creditors might not be easily computed under current 11 U.S.C. § 509.
